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The purpose of this study is to evaluate the Open Architecture Warfare System Domain 
Model (OAWSDM) against surface time critical targets with a primary focus on 
Command, Control, and Communication (C3) processes. In addition, to the concepts of 
Open Architecture this project explores FORCEnet and various technological 
applications to improve the time required to engage small boat attacks. 
 
Beginning with the OAWSDM, a functional analysis was conducted to better understand 
the component functions in the architecture. These functions were then synthesized into 
the Open Architecture Time Critical Target Engagement Process Model (OATCTEPM) 
created in the Arena® software package. This model represents the notional engagement 
cycle of a Navy cruiser from the time the threat is detected until it is neutralized.  Two 
scenarios were developed to exercise the system.  The first scenario is a surprise assault 
from a number of small personal watercraft.  The second scenario is a saturation assault 
in which approximately fifty crafts of varying sizes attack.  Results from these scenarios 
were analyzed for system bottlenecks and process critical paths.  Using this data, 
recommended improvements to data flow and decision making were implemented and 
the scenarios rerun. 
 
The study concludes that, with respect to time critical targets, the time required to process 
the embedded C3 functions is excessive given the limited engagement window presented 
by TCT.  Processes that required human interaction showed the longest delays and 
impacted the effectiveness of the OAWSDM against time critical targets.  Future research 
in the C3 element should focus on reducing the time required to execute those sub-





A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Over the last twenty years the mission of the US Navy has evolved considerably. 
Consequently, as the cold-war era moved to the war on terrorism, traditional naval battle-
group warfare has given way to a more network-centric based architecture, which can 
range from a single-platform combating close-in targets, to coordinated global 
information warfare.  In response, naval leadership has steered its emphasis toward a 
theoretical model, known as the Open Architecture Warfare System Domain Model 
(OAWSDM) to address the multitude of changing, and new, mission requirements for the 
US Navy. 
 
As part of this new era of terrorism, the enemy seeks to use unconventional methods and 
surprise to inflict maximum damage. Therefore this paper examined the OAWSDM, as 
presented, to determine its effectiveness against time critical targets.  To test this 
architecture, a detailed model based on the OAWSDM was developed and evaluated to 
determine its effectiveness. Specific focus was applied to the Command, Control, and 
Communication (C3) portion of the architecture and alternatives were explored in an 
effort to shorten the kill chain. 
 
In order to evaluate the OAWSDM, two scenarios presented were developed to serve as 
inputs for the Open Architecture Time Critical Targeting Engagement Process Model 
(OATCTEPM) (constructed using the Arena® software package), as it has been 
interpreted by the authors of this paper.  These scenarios represent attacks by potential 
adversaries and terrorist organizations in the regions where they are staged.  Both 
scenarios involve Fast In-shore Attack Craft (FIAC) designed to disable or destroy a US 
Naval High-Value Unit (HVU).  These are further discussed later in the paper and 




To fully understand the problems presented by a TCT, there are several key topics 
that must be defined and understood. These topics encompass time critical targets, kill 
chains and types of target kill and are meant to familiarize the reader with these topics 
prior to proceeding through the rest of the paper. The OAWSDM is also discussed in this 
section to provide background information on the functional model. 
 
1. Time Critical Targets 
In order to understand the problems presented by a time critical target, some 
fundamental questions first must be addressed on what is meant by a Time Critical Target 
(TCT) and how it is different from a typical target. Specifically, the following questions 
are answered:   
 
1. What is a TCT?  
2. Why is a TCT important? 
3. How is a TCT typically prosecuted? 
4. What deficiencies exist in targeting a TCT? 
 
What is a time critical target? 
A time critical target, as the name implies, “…is one with a limited 
window of vulnerability or engagement opportunity during which it must be found, 
located, identified, targeted, and engaged” (Perry and others 2002).  The firing solution 
for this type of target must flow through the targeting process quickly in order to achieve 
a target kill.  Once acquired, a TCT requires an immediate response.  The difficulty in 
targeting a TCT lies in the fact that all targeting phases must act with a limited amount of 
time. 
 
Why is a time critical target important? 
In the late 1990s, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), along 
with the service doctrine commands identified the need for engagement of a TCT.  
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Enemies have realized that techniques such as hiding, deception, and constant movement 
have been very effective against the United States and have exploited these tactics with 
some success. One recent example of a TCT attack was that perpetrated on the USS 
COLE, which occurred on October 12, 2000. That morning, the ship was approached on 
the port side by a small craft with an explosive device onboard. It detonated, killing 
seventeen sailors and leaving a 35 by 36 foot hole in the side of the destroyer. The Judge 
Advocate General Manual (JAGMAN) investigation of the USS COLE bombing found 
that "the Commanding Officer of COLE did not have the specific intelligence, focused 
training, appropriate equipment or on-scene security support to effectively prevent or 
deter such a determined, preplanned assault on his ship" going on to recommend 
significant changes in Navy procedures. (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
2004) 
 
A second example of a TCT in modern warfare is that of valuable enemy 
assets that must be eliminated when the opportunity arises. These could take the form of 
enemy leadership or highly mobile weapons. “In Operation Desert Storm, Scud missile 
transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicles constantly eluded coalition efforts to find 
them as they launched 40 missiles into Israel. Even though [General] Charles Horner, 
joint force air and space component commander (JFACC), prioritized the destruction of 
Scud TELs to a high level and dedicated more than 4,700 sorties to the effort, postwar 
intelligence showed no proof that a single Scud was destroyed.” (Marzolf 2004) Missed 
opportunities to capture enemy leadership have been publicized in the news over and 
over again. When the US began the effort to ensure the newly formed government of 
Afghanistan would succeed, called Operation Anaconda, by initiating a push to capture or 
kill the remaining Taliban and Al Qaeda members still hiding in that country, many 
managed to escape into neighboring Pakistan. Those who eluded capture include Osama 
Bin Laden, who still remains free to this day, in part because of the inefficiency of the 
Time Critical Targeting process.  (Lambeth 2005).   
 
  4
How is a time critical target typically prosecuted? 
A TCT is subjected to the same targeting phases as other targets, but the 
process must be completed in a much smaller time period.  The general process for 
prosecuting any target involves locating, identifying, tracking, attacking, and evaluating. 
Due to the small amount of time to prosecute a TCT, lost opportunities become common. 
Unfortunately this allows the TCT to appear, complete its mission, and disappear. The 
engagement process is further detailed as well as the use of soft and hard kills. 
 
What deficiencies exist in targeting a time critical target? 
The Office of Naval Research (ONR) identified Time Critical Targets as a 
future threat for which defensive and offensive capabilities must be established.  The 
ONR report went on to state that the enemy “…will be mobile and moving, they will do 
their best to hide in clutter, and they will we uncomfortably close to friends and neutrals.”  
(Office of Naval Research 2001) Problems with engaging TCTs include “…a lack of 
necessary information and time constraints.” (Marzolf 2004) In order to engage TCTs 
successfully, there must be a seamless flow of information between assets within the 
battlespace, allowing the war fighters to have a heightened level of awareness.  It is 
conceivable that if the USS COLE had this heightened awareness level and had obtained 
information about a possible small boat attack that the outcome of this event would have 
been much different. Open Architecture and FORCEnet are intended to be key enablers 
for the development of solutions that provide this necessary, seamless flow of 
information between assets in the battlespace. 
 
2. Target Engagement Process 
One of the many goals of OA implementation is to shorten the time-line 
associated with a combat system’s Detect, Control, and Engage (DCE) functions.  This 
sequence of events is known in the vernacular as the “kill chain”.  The kill chain is 
analogized with the well-known “OODA-Loop” model (Observe, Orient, Decide, and 
Act) and is the fundamental underlying process undertaken subconsciously by humans in 




Figure 1.   Target Engagement Process 
This comparison demonstrates that the Kill Chain is fundamentally based 
on the same basic process as the OODA Loop or a basic human decision 
loop. 
 
It is logical to assert here, that a shorter kill chain supports the concepts of 
intercepting an inbound target farther away from own ship, freeing up assets to support 
other engagements in the queue (or re-engagement of a target, in the event of a miss). 
 
3. Target Kill 
There are varying levels of kill assessments for different types of targets and 
weapons.  Naveh (2001) defined the hard kill as the actual physical contact between the 
interceptor (whole, or fragments) and the target, causing its destruction versus a soft kill, 
which is brought about by preventing the target from completing its mission through the 
use of electronic countermeasures (jamming). Other types of “kills” include mission and 
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mobility kill, which are closely related and refer to incapacitating the target to a level that 
renders it ineffective. 
 
For the purposes of this paper, the term “target kill” refers to the complete 
destruction of the targets of interest through direct contact by the interceptor. 
Additionally, there is no observed difference among the definitions for a hard kill, 
mission or mobility kill. This approach was used to facilitate the behavior of the model 
and eliminate confusion in this area. 
 
4. Open Architecture Warfare System Domain Model 
The concepts of Open Architecture (OA), FORCEnet, and others are defined and 
discussed in detail in the next section of this paper; however, a short introduction to the 
OAWSDM is given here, as this key concept serves as the backbone of this report.  The 
OAWSDM, depicted in figure 2, has been published in the FORCEnet Implementation 
Strategy (NRC 2005), as well as many other reports and papers.   
 
The strategy serves to demonstrate the framework for a loosely-coupled, service-
oriented combat system architecture, which is important to realizing the goals of 
network-centric operations.  The second section of this paper describes the 
interrelationships between the OAWSDM, FORCEnet and the Sea Power 21 vision in 
more detail.  A true instantiation of this framework does not exist today; however, there 
are some services such as Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) and Precise Time and Time 
Interval (PTTI) (based on Global Positioning System (GPS) networks), which are 
enabling technologies in the form of achieving target correlation among separated 




Figure 2.   Open Architecture Warfare System Domain Model (OAWSDM)  
This paper serves to evaluate the OAWSDM in its handling of time critical 
targets. The model was developed to address the implementation of OA on 
Navy ships. (Deerin and others 2006) 
 
The service-oriented nature of this architecture enables the cross-utilization of 
resources among the current service-specific air, subsurface, surface, and land warfare 
domains.  It is hypothesized here that the OAWSDM, while capable of supporting many 
functions across all warfare domains, is not sufficient for addressing certain forms of time 







C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
 
The objective of this research paper is to document the evaluation of the Open 
Architecture Warfare System Domain Model as a foundation for future systems that must 
engage time critical targets. This includes whether the OAWSDM is valid in these 
engagements and if there are any improvements that can be made to more effectively deal 
with a TCT. While the OAWSDM involves the target engagement sequence from initial 
detection to putting ordnance on target, this research focuses on the command, control, 
and communication functions within the architecture, holding both the detection and 
weapon capabilities as constant across all analyses. Given this overall objective, a 
research methodology is defined in support of this objective. This methodology is 
delineated below and explored in the rest of this paper. 
 
D. SITUATION ASSESSMENT 
 
From the objective, all the relevant areas were researched, from operational 
doctrines such as Future Naval Fires to technologies that would help implement and 
improve this time critical engagement such as FORCEnet and automated decision aids. 
The next section offers a historical perspective on the need for this research. 
 
1. The Past 
In recent history, experiences in the Persian Gulf (1991 and 2003-present) and 
Kosovo (1995-1998) revealed a limited ability to rapidly identify and strike time critical 
targets. In the Gulf War, for example, Air Force and Navy pilots were frustrated in 
attempts to destroy mobile Scud launchers before the vehicles fired their missiles.  US 
aircraft had an extremely small window of opportunity to destroy the missiles on the 
ground.  The time it took to locate the launchers exceeded the time it took the Iraqis to 
shoot and relocate (Hebert 2003). The time needed to effectively attack these mobile 
targets is much shorter than the established 30 to 72 hour targeting cycle needed to attack 
most ground targets (Wiggins 2001). Even more so than the semi-stationary Scud 
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launcher in clear skies, emerging targets are a challenge at night and even more of a 
challenge when there is significant weather (Hebert 2003). 
 
At this time, it was noted that all the systems involved in the sensor to shooter 
process do not operate effectively together. The many systems needed to identify and 
strike targets are separately owned and operated by each of the military services as well 
as other Department of Defense (DOD) and intelligence community agencies. During 
these operations, over 100 command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance systems were needed to identify and strike a target. These systems 
had limited ability to interoperate both technically (such as incompatible data formats) 
and operationally (legacy sensors tend to work in classic stovepipes that do not share data 
outside of the domain of the host system (Rushton 2004)). Given this reality, these 
systems simply cannot easily and quickly exchange the information to combat time 
critical targets (Wiggins 2001). 
 
The Joint Forces Commander was faced with integrating more than 400 different 
mission and software applications resulting in over 100 different operational architecture 
efforts. The DOD’s Director for Interoperability estimated that there were $36 billion 
worth of systems that the services planned to buy that would not be able to operate 
together effectively. The Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC), whose mission it is 
to test pieces of equipment that pertain to multiple branches of the armed services or 
other agencies, does not have the facilities needed to test the interactions between all 
weapons systems and information systems. Due to this factor, organizations have not 
always complied with the interoperability testing and certification process. At this time, 
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) was also not focused on evaluating 
systems from a joint war fighting perspective. DOD still lacks a joint service concept of 
operations to defeat time critical targets and, as a result, each military service plans and 
acquires systems to meet requirements under its own concept of operations. The only 
acceptable solution decided upon was that duplicative and disparate systems would not be 
allowed to go forward (Wiggins 2001). 
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2. Present 
While much has improved in the past decade, there is still much work ahead. 
During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the Air Tasking Order (ATO) has 
been decreased from 72 to 24 hours, and 80 percent of the targets destroyed were passed 
to pilots after they had left the carrier deck showing a definite improvement since 
operations in the early and mid nineties (NRC 2005). The Navy delivered four times the 
tonnage of goods and equipment for Operation Iraqi Freedom in four months than it 
delivered for Desert Storm during a total of seven months of operations (Barkenhagen 
2004). 
 
A maritime information environment called FORCEnet is under development, 
which is an extension of the Global Information Grid (GIG). FORCEnet requires a 
seamless and timely flow of data to be transformed into executable information. 
Consequently, it is also meant to provide the knowledge-building protocols through the 
tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare. This connectivity that allows real-
time weapons systems must be in the same IP based technology as the operational 
system, though, necessitating a more joint design methodology and thorough joint testing.  
 
Modern systems like the AEGIS Weapon System and the Ship Self Defense 
System currently have archaic, monolithic, and proprietary software conditions that need 
to be transformed into modern applications that conform to open commercial standards so 
the FORCEnet vision can be met (Rushton 2004). OA enables a new approach in 
acquiring and managing reusable software components while taking advantage of 
standards-based computing technologies from the Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) 
marketplace.  Most current combat and weapon systems are considered either Category 1 
or 2 OA compliant, which are system designs that are precursors to true modular (de-
coupled) hardware and software condition.  Category 4 is a maturation of the Open 
Architecture environment to allow cross platform use of common applications such as in 
an identical word processing application running on LINUX, Windows, Apple, or other 
computer operating systems. (Rushton 2004) 
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 The Open Architecture Computing Environment (OACE) planned to provide: 
• A flexible foundation for rapidly introducing new warfighting capabilities 
into the combat system to pace the threat 
• Interoperability across diverse joint battle management command & 
control systems 
• A system design that fosters affordable development and life-cycle 
maintenance 
• A system design that reduces upgrade cycle time and time-to-deployment 
for new features 
• An architecture that allows technology refresh despite rapid COTS 
obsolescence 
• Improvements in Human Systems Integration (Rushton 2004). 
 
The OAWSDM was primarily defined by: 
• Identifying Navy war-fighting functionality across platforms and systems 
that may include commonality of function, processing, design, interface, 
and/or data/information exchange; and 
• Further identify those systems, functions, or interfaces that are unique to 
particular Navy platforms. The OACE must be capable of executing the 
performance requirements for the warfighting capabilities in the proposed 
OAWSDM (Rushton 2004). 
 
Even with all these enhancements, many current systems incorporate design 
features based on the DOD-led computing technologies of the 1980s. Consequently, 
weapon system enhancements have caused adjunct relationships in handling sensor data 
and the elements of the common tactical data picture.  The net result has been to establish 
a challenging correlation problem across multiple track databases. Interoperability across 
the battle force is more precise than before but less coherent, as the various mechanisms 
for reporting track objects failed to coalesce into a common picture. With command 
support from ISR, distributed, and collaborative planning tools not fully integrated, crews 




In “The Critical Network Centric Warfare Enabler”, Rushton states that in order 
to further evolve this system for the better, the user must be preeminent in defining what 
information is needed. In order to use the limited available bandwidth efficiently, the 
information transmission and retrieval scheme must only transmit information that the 
warrior specifically needs or requests. The identification, shipping instructions, and 
retrieval options must be sufficiently flexible to meet the warrior’s rapidly changing 
mission requirements. Network Centric capabilities are essential to meeting the 
requirements of the littoral and inland battlespace in which maritime forces must operate 
for the foreseeable future. 
 
Today, the DOD no longer leads or even significantly influences developments in 
information technology. The commercial, non-DoD, market place that drives the pace 
and character of information technology has embraced OA. Key tenets of the GIG and 
FORCEnet, such as web based command and control, information dissemination 
management, and modern human systems integration depend on OA in COTS based 
products. (Rushton 2004) 
 
3. Future 
The desired future state is one of total connectivity. It is the difference between 
disparate ships being involved in a larger-scale operation and a single battle group or 
fleet, using their combined sensing abilities to have extensive battlespace awareness, 
being able to call to action an optimized combination of offensive and defensive 
capabilities from all involved platforms to achieve mission success. It will be a network 
enabled foundation that allows the collaborative use of distributed warfare assets for time 
critical operations where the best shooter is selected from a set of geographically 
distributed firing units to improve the chances of intercepting targets and improve the 
economy of weapon resources. Earlier launch decisions will be possible when sensors are 
intelligently tasked based on shared knowledge of the battlespace. Sensors and weapons 
will not have to be paired for engagements. This will lead to the effective kinematical 
range of weapons being expanded and additional operational capabilities such as forward 
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pass and off-board engagement support for guidance relay and target illumination will be 
available. Complex threat environments, in which sophisticated or significant numbers of 
aerospace targets exist, will use automated collaborative fire control or integrated fire 
control. (Young 2005) 
 
Fire-control systems will utilize a decentralized architecture with smart nodes that 
communicate and collaborate over a network.  Information is shared among the 
distributed units and each unit will develop a shared picture of the battlespace.  From the 
shared picture, each unit will determine the best use of the Force’s resources and task 
local resources. This will allow common functions to be used across the Force and a 
force-wide perspective to be used in managing resources. (Young 2005) 
 
According to Rushton, future systems designers will have an operational 
imperative to ensure that the fundamental tenets of joint interoperability are realized in 
order to achieve a robust network centric warfare capability. The GIG will provide the 
enabling foundation for Network Centric Warfare (NCW), information superiority, 
decision superiority, and full spectrum dominance. This will lead to dramatically 
improved information positions, in the form of common operational pictures that will 
provide the basis for shared situational awareness and knowledge, and a resulting 
increase in combat power. The ability to achieve shared situational awareness and 
knowledge among all elements of a joint force, in conjunction with allied and coalition 
partners, is viewed as a cornerstone of transformation to achieve future warfighting 
capabilities. Success in exploiting the GIG in NCW depends in large part on how well it 
achieves interoperability and force-wide information sharing through the implementation 
of FORCEnet (Rushton 2004). 
 
One of the key elements essential to the success of future war-fighters is a highly 
responsive, high-capacity GIG that allows them to integrate and synchronize their 
capabilities within the multitude of fluid, rapidly changing military operational 
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environments that must respond to ever-changing missions. Accurate, timely, secure, and 
assured information will allow commanders and their staffs to gain and apply superior 
knowledge and understanding of the battlespace. This will manifest in the ability to 
collaboratively formulate and disseminate plans and orders, synchronize forces, exert 
effective control over the battlespace, sustain a high velocity of action, and help achieve 
full-spectrum dominance over the enemy (Rushton 2004). 
 
This information synchronization will enable the future war-fighters’ ability to 
operate with reduced forces at high operational tempos where dynamic planning and 
redirection of assets is the norm. Delivery of information concerning targets, movement 
of forces, condition of equipment, levels of supplies, and disposition of assets to joint 
commanders, their forces, and the President and SECDEF within specified time frames 
will be possible. This will lead to the war-fighters’ ability to obtain and use combat and 
administrative support information from national, allied, coalition, and other widely 
dispersed assets. Overall, collection, processing, storage, distribution, and display of 
information horizontally and vertically throughout organizational structures across the 
battlespace will occur (Rushton 2004). 
 
This timeline can be summarized around a few major points that should be remembered 
as this study is further discussed. 
• Legacy combat systems have historically been developed and operated in a stove-
pipe environment. 
• Recent attempts by the JROC to force a paradigm shift to a network centric, 
interoperable battle group have not been completely successful and have led to 
challenging correlation problems in the endeavor to create a common air picture. 
• The tenets of FORCEnet provide a conceptual framework for new system 
development, and OA provides the enabling technologies to realize this concept. 
• The future will hold extensive battle space awareness for the entire joint force, as 
well as the capabilities to operate as a fully integrated, offensive or defensive, 
unit. 
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E. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The approach followed through the study is discussed in the following items. 
These steps form a narrowing approach to the problem, beginning with a familiarization 
of current doctrine and research in the areas pertinent to the objective. From this, along 
with the target OAWSDM, a scope and bounds analysis and input/output study was 
conducted and the findings provided the needed information to construct a context 
diagram.  From that context diagram, a functional flow is developed. Based on the 
analysis of the engagement process, enough information was gained to begin the 
construction of a simulation model, which is used to study a theoretical design based on 
the components of the OAWSDM. This design is then exercised with scenarios designed 
to represent valid time critical targets of a small boat nature. By changing assumed 
parameters in the model pertaining to human input into the system, the C3 times, the 
relationship between decision making efficiency and overall mission effectiveness is 
shown. Conclusions and future work recommendations are finally discussed for this 
study. The specific steps are listed below and further explained: 
• Problem Definition and Enabling Technology 
o Initial Problem Definition (Section I) 
o Literature Search (Section II) 
o OAWSDM Decomposition & Analysis (Section III. B.) 
o Input-Output Analysis (Section III. C.) 
o Scope and Bounds Analysis (Section III. D.) 
• Functional Analysis & Allocation (Section III. E.) 
o Context Diagram 
o Functional Flow  
• Scenario Development  
o Operational View (Section IV. B.) 
o Metrics Definition (Section IV. C.) 
o OATCTEP Model Scenario Definition (Section IV. D.) 
o OATCTEP Model & Scenario Assumptions (Section IV. E.) 
• Synthesize Model Blocks & Subsystems 
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o Radar Model Design (Section IV. F.) 
o System Model Design (Section IV. G.) 
• Run Scenarios 
o OATCTEPM Simulation Results Analysis & Evaluation (Section V.) 
1. Research Current Naval Doctrine 
The purpose of this step is to outline current Naval Doctrine related to this effort. 
This includes FORCEnet, Future Naval Fires, Open Architecture, and SeaPower 21. It is 
important to understand the framework in which all of the succeeding research will fit 
into and also to ensure that any recommendations that are generated from this research 
also abide by current and future Naval vision. 
 
2. Identify Important Enablers 
Once the framework is defined, the literature search addresses all areas relevant to 
the primary objective. Initial searches include current threats, target engagement, existing 
time critical target models, and research performed on the OAWSDM. Once this is 
accomplished, technologies which may improve the response to time critical targets are 
identified and explored. Specifically, the areas of expeditionary pervasive sensing, 
automated decision aides, system learning and adaptation, and fuzzy logic are important 
enablers for increased ability to engage TCTs. 
 
3. Decompose and Analyze the OAWSDM 
The Open Architecture Warfare System Domain Model is decomposed so that a 
detailed analysis of its ability to successfully prosecute a time critical target could be 
measured. This begins with defining the general inputs and outputs, as well as its scope 
and bounds and constructing a context diagram.  These functions are then mapped to a 
process flow, transforming the OAWSDM into a process model, which can then be 





4. Develop a TCT Engagement Model 
This model will simulate various engagements with predefined targets and 
measure the effectiveness of a typical system, within the construct of the OAWSDM, in 
being able to engage those targets. A baseline model is created which is then altered in an 
effort to improve the response of the system based on the initial findings. This model is 
understandably a simplification of a highly complex system, and as such, all assumptions 
are documented during its creation. 
 
5. Develop Time Critical Targeting Scenarios 
Once the model input requirements are defined, scenarios are developed which 
represent realistic time critical engagements for the system. These scenarios exercise 
different aspects of the architecture and seek to define the system performance as much 
as possible in the scope of the research.  
 
6. Develop Measures of Effectiveness 
Upon completion of the scenarios and baseline model, measures of effectiveness 
(MOEs) are defined in order to objectively evaluate the performance of the system. These 
MOEs represent key characteristics of system effectiveness in the scenarios. The MOEs 
are used to gauge success and failure of the simulation and in comparing the baseline 
with any suggested upgrades. 
 
7. Obtain and Analyze Baseline Results 
Using the time critical target scenarios and the baseline configuration of the 
model, a statistically significant number of simulation iterations are run. These results are 
analyzed for trends and compared to the predefined measures of effectiveness. Based on 
these results, key areas for improvement are identified. These improvements can be either 
structural or numerical in nature. The structural improvements are derived from areas in 
which parallel or otherwise reduced processing can occur to speed up TCT engagements. 
Numerical improvements involve reducing individual input time parameters based on 
applicable research concerning technological improvement.  
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8. Incorporate Model Improvements and Rerun 
Using improvements suggested by the analysis performed on the baseline model 
results, incorporate improvements as possible. The effect of these improvements can then 
be analyzed for their statistical significance in improved effectiveness.  
 
9. Document Results and Recommendations 
The final step of the research methodology is to fully document the above work, 
and with the results of the baseline and improved models, to provide recommendations on 
how to effectively use the OAWSDM architecture to implement systems that can combat 
time critical targets. 
 
F. SCOPE 
The methodology used to analyze the effectiveness of a system based on the 
OAWSDM in prosecuting a surface based Naval TCT. The simulation presented herein is 
based on a single fictional cruiser engaging all incoming targets. The simulation takes 
place in a busy shipping lane in a potentially hostile area. Simulation results assume clear 
skies and calm seas. The simulation does not take into account machinery breakdown, 
soft kill effects, or target probability of hitting the ship. The simulation was constructed 
using two scenarios, one representing a quick engagement with fewer targets and one 
representing a saturation attack by many targets. Other scenarios may show different 
results. All target and ship parameters are rough estimates and are only meant to be 
representative enough to compare system performance across scenarios and with 
proposed improvements.  
 
G. OUTPUTS 
The significant output is to show the effect of the C3 functions on the overall 
effectiveness level for the OAWSDM in combating a TCT. Proposed improvements to 
the existing architecture are given and probable improvements through the use of such 
technology are presented. The design for the simulation used for this study is presented 
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throughout the paper including actual model flow, assumptions, and parameters. Detailed 
data on the scenarios used is provided as well. 
 
H. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER 
 
Section II provides the results of a detailed literature search on topics used during 
the development of this thesis.  Section III contains a thorough explanation of the 
methodology used to develop the OATCTEPM from the OAWSDM, the OODA Loop, 
and other sources found during the literature search.  Section IV introduces the scenarios 
developed to run in the OATCTEPM, the measures of effectiveness used to analyze the 
results, the overall design of the OATCTEPM, and the assumptions made during the 
development of these.  Section V presents the results of the scenario simulations and 
analysis of alternative technologies that improve the response to small boat TCTs in the 
OAFDM.  Section VI contains conclusions and final recommendations, including those 
for future research.   
 
The paper also contains four appendices, including a detailed description of the 
two scenarios used in this paper, a walkthrough of the simulation model, an explanation 
of the radar model calculations and a detailed explanation of the improved model study. 
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II. LITERATURE SEARCH 
In order to fully understand the research objective, a thorough literature search 
was conducted, producing two results.  The first result was a foundation on which the 
group based all assumptions, constraints, scope, bounds, and scenarios.  Secondly, it 
provided a better understanding of stakeholder concerns and established the building 
blocks for the analysis and conclusions provided later in this paper. Furthermore, the 
problems presented by this research are neither new, nor unique, to the US Navy.  Every 
attempt was made to not only thoroughly understand and document DoD and Navy 
requirements, but also to obtain lessons learned from current and previous work to solve 
similar problems. Key topics reviewed in this section are Open Architecture, FORCEnet, 
Time Critical Targets, Future Naval Fires, Expeditionary Pervasive Sensing, Service 
Oriented Architecture, and the OODA Loop and Target Engagement Processes.   
 
A.  OPEN ARCHITECTURE 
 
The Navy’s implementation of Open Architecture evolved in response to the 
Department of Defense (DoD) requirement to implement Modular Open Systems.  In 
May of 2003, the DoD released DoD Directive (DoDD) 5000.1, which stated that 
“Acquisition programs shall be managed through the application of a systems 
engineering approach that optimizes total system performance and minimizes total 
ownership costs. A modular, open-systems approach shall be employed, where feasible." 
(DoDD 5000.1 2003)  This concept is further explained in Chapter 4.4.1 of the DoD 
Acquisition Guidebook.  It defines an open system as a “…system that employs modular 
design tenets, uses widely supported and consensus-based standards for its key interfaces, 
and is subject to validation and verification tests to ensure the openness of its key 
interfaces.” (Defense Acquisition Guidebook 2006)  It further defines an open systems 
design as  
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A design approach for developing an affordable and adaptable open system. It 
derives inputs from both the technical management processes and technical 
processes undertaken within the systems engineering and other life-cycle 
processes, and in turn impacts these processes. The open systems design strategy 
should be implemented as part of the program’s overall technical approach and 
must become an integral part of the program’s SEP.  (Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook 2006) 
 
In order to facilitate the implementation of an open systems approach, in section 
2.3.15 of the Defense Acquisition Guidebook five Modular Open System Approach 
(MOSA) principles are established:  
• Establish an Enabling Environment 
• Employ Modular Design 
• Design Key Interfaces 
• Use Open Standards and  
• Certify Conformance. 
DoD also created the Open Systems Joint Task Force (OSJTF) which has published 
further guidance on the implementation of MOSA.  This information can be found in the 
Program Managers Guide. (PMG 2004)  
 
In response to the DoD Open Systems requirement, the Department of the Navy 
established Open Architecture in its first memorandum on the subject, Naval Open 
Architecture Scope and Responsibilities, in August of 2004.  It amplified and expanded 
“…upon the policy, guidance and direction necessary for the successful implementation 
of the Navy’s Open Architecture (OA) Strategy” (Young 2004).  It was followed later in 
the month of August by two documents defining the Open Architecture Computing 
Environment.  These documents, Open Architecture (OA) Computing Environment 
Design Guidance Version 1.0 and Open Architecture (OA) Computing Environment 
Design Technologies and Standards Version 1.0, established specific technical 
requirements and guidance necessary for the implementation of OA.  In December of 
  23
2005, the Navy showed further commitment to OA implementation by releasing another 
memorandum from the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations entitled “Requirement for 
Open Architecture (OA) Implementation” (OACEDG 2004).  As the memorandum 
stated, the Navy must “…shorten the kill chain across the family of systems…” and 
“…shorten the time and cost it takes to deliver capability improvements.”  Since this 
memo the Navy has also released the Naval Open Architecture Contract Guidebook and 
the Open Architecture Assessment Model (OAAM) to assist program managers in 
integrating OA within their programs. (Edwards 2005) 
 
Further information on Open Architecture can be found on the Defense 
Acquisition University’s web site (DAU 2007).  According to this site, Open Architecture 
is defined as, “A multi-faceted strategy providing a framework for developing joint, 
interoperable systems that adapt and exploit open system design principles and 
architectures.”  The Open Architecture framework consists of a set of principles, 
processes and best practices that address the following: 
• “Provide more opportunities for competition  
• Optimize total system performance  
• Are easily developed and upgraded  
• Minimize total ownership costs  
• Rapidly field affordable, interoperable systems 
• Employ non-proprietary standards for internal interface 
• Enable component reuse.” 
 
B.  FORCENET 
Using Open Architecture, the United States Navy (USN) is currently pursuing a 
real-time, situational awareness concept called FORCEnet to aid in decision making 
capabilities and distributing combative power where needed.  FORCEnet is defined in the 
FORCEnet Implementation Strategy as 
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…the operational construct and architectural framework for naval warfare in the 
information age that integrates warriors, sensors, networks, command and 
control, platforms, and weapons into a networked, distributed, combat force that 
is scalable across all levels of conflict from seabed to space and sea to land. 
(Mayo and Nathman 2003)  
 
FORCEnet is intended to leverage several computing and network technologies to 
help the Navy realize the Net-Centric concept of warfare and information exchange.  
“FORCEnet will help create a unified battlespace by providing near-instantaneous 
collection, analysis, and dissemination of information coupled to advanced computer-
driven decision aids to joint force commanders” (Mayo and Nathman 2003).  FORCEnet 
may also provide the advantage of information superiority to increase responsiveness and 
survivability by allowing forces to disperse while focusing offensive and defensive 
firepower from afar.  FORCEnet is meant to provide the information that enables 
knowledge-based operations, delivering greater power, protection, and operational 
independence than ever before possible to joint force commanders. 
Implementing the concept of FORCEnet depends upon development of network 
architecture, such as the Global Information Grid (GIG), which is comprised of standard 
joint protocols, common data packages, seamless interoperability, and enhanced security.  
US Navy assets, as well as joint services, agencies, and allied nations could feed that 
network. 
According to the Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) in Newport, 
Rhode Island, “…FORCEnet will focus its efforts on integrating existing networks, 
sensors, and command and control systems” (Mayo and Nathman 2003). In the future, the 
system evolves into a fully netted force that allows commanders to engage the battlefield 
with increased awareness and quicker reaction time. It also provides real-time enhanced 
collaborative planning among joint and coalition forces. With greater sharing of time 
sensitive information and knowledge of threats, friendly forces experience increased 
survivability and effectiveness. FORCEnet has the following intended impacts: 
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• Connected warriors, sensors, networks, command and control, platforms, 
and weapons 
• Accelerated speed and accuracy of decision 
• Integrated knowledge to dominate the battlespace 
These impacts are some of the key benefits to implementing FORCEnet.  The 
future capabilities required of FORCEnet include but are not limited to: 
• Expeditionary, multi-tiered, sensor and weapons grids 
• Distributed, collaborative command and control 
• Dynamic, multi-path and survivable networks 
• Adaptive / automated decision aids 
• Human-centric integration 
 
By implementing Open Architecture into FORCEnet many benefits will be 
realized.  In utilizing a Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) through open 
architecture, FORCEnet will experience superior availability, supportability, reliability, 
and maintainability.  This is achieved by making the system scalable and modular.  With 
multiple inputs into the system a greater redundancy will be present which in turn 
enhances availability by allowing for graceful degradation.  By employing an open 
architectural framework, the interoperability of the system greatly increases.  For more 
than twelve years now the Navy and the DoD have been working to develop a Single 
Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) and have yet been able to build one.  This is primarily due 
to the lack of standard interfaces which in turn has inhibited systems’ interoperability.  
For proper data fusion, FORCEnet needs to establish and implement standards along with 
information architectures that lead to deterministic outcomes. (Mayo and Nathman 2003)   
 
An advantage to further developing the FORCEnet concept using Open 
Architecture is that it allows for an incremental development.  This means that older 
subsystems can be replaced and newer technologies can be inserted in phases since it 
would not be possible to update every element simultaneously.  The information 
architecture for FORCEnet is thought of as a boundary between layers of functionality 
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that is held constant and allows developments to progress independently on all sides of 
the boundary.  
 
FORCEnet is faced by many challenges such as interoperability problems, old 
architectures that are difficult to change or adapt, expensive and time-consuming 
refreshes, and high cost of acquisition and support.  These challenges are the 
main drivers to the open architecture initiative of the Navy and DoD.  In respect 
to Open Architecture, the FORCEnet community is especially interested in the 
topic of Open Architecture Computing Environment (OACE) where attention has 
been drawn to functional partitioning and interface control.  This is what is 
required for FORCEnet but currently lacking in the architecture and standards 




Figure 3.   FORCEnet and relationship to the Global Information Grid  
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This figure shows the relationship between the next generation Army, Air 
Force, and Navy architectures and, in turn, their relationship to the 
Global Information Grid. (Bell 2004) 
 
It should be noted that the functionality of FORCEnet is a subset to battle force 
functionality in that it contributes to the battle management, battlespace dominance, and 
sustaining control over the battlespace.  “The definition of interfaces between FORCEnet 
and other systems will continue to be an ongoing process.” (NRC 2005) 
 
C. TIME CRITICAL TARGETING 
The concept of Time Critical Targeting is central to the issue under investigation.  
The targeting process must take on the ability to effectively obtain detection information, 
process that information, and utilize it to place ordnance on target. 
 
Research in the area of Time Critical Targeting was conducted in an inside-out 
pattern, starting with the identification of the need to improve the prosecution of these 
fleeting targets from within all military communities (a joint observation), followed by 
component perspectives; ground troops, naval platforms, and air platforms.  These three 
perspectives are both unique and very similar, at the same time.   
 
1. DoD Joint Perspective 
In a letter from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to Congressman 
Jerry Lewis, Chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, these perspectives 
were addressed with several examples.  It highlighted DoD studies that point out a variety 
of reasons that “sensor to shooter” timelines are ineffective against TCTs.  This weakness 
is well-known and exploited by the enemy.  The primary reason behind this shortcoming 
is stated to be a lack of interoperability between the various systems employed by the 
various services.  This document also explored reasons that previous efforts to bridge this 
gap have failed, “…because the services were unwilling to forego their unique 
requirements in favor of requirements that would benefit the department as a whole.” 
(Wiggins 2001)  Additional reasons were also given. 
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A publication called The Joint Targeting Process and Procedures For Targeting 
Time-Critical Targets was produced in 1997 and was “…prepared under the direction of 
the Commander, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC); Commanding 
General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC); Commander, Naval 
Doctrine Command (NDC); and Commander, Air Combat Command (ACC),” and 
established Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) for addressing time critical 
targets.  Although this is a 10-year old publication, the tenets for the joint targeting 
process remain valid and current: joint battlespace control, coordination measures, “grid 
box”, and “bull’s eye” techniques, interconnecting battle management (C2) systems.  The 
impact that time has had on this concept is that the enabling technology has improved 
over the last 10 years and the goal is becoming more achievable. (USAF 1996) 
 
2. Service Component Perspectives 
Air Force Efforts 
 
The Air Force is developing a new family of systems to attack time-critical targets 
that are expected to reduce attack times.  For example, the time-critical targeting 
cell initiative will provide the air component commander’s air operations center 
an ability to detect and direct forces to attack targets quickly.  The theater battle 
management core system is expected to merge several legacy systems such as its 
Air Tasking Order [(ATO)] system, which controls employment of fixed wing 
aircraft in the battle area with new capabilities, to reduce the timelines to attack 
time-critical targets. (Wiggins 2001) 
 
Several critical points were made in a presentation by Brig Gen Jim Morehouse, 
Director of C2 DCS and Air & Space Operations.  Among them it was pointed out that 
the amount of time allowable for prosecution of time critical targets could be as low as 
single-digit minutes.  Secondly, it was highlighted that the prosecution of these target 
isn’t just dropping bombs (kinetic), but it could also be in the form of information 
operations, or even humanitarian relief.  (Morehouse 2002) 
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Two approaches to TCT have been proposed, Reactive and Preemptive (Marzolf 
2004).  The preemptive (or predictive) revolves around utilizing intelligence to predict 
the locations of time critical threats and the employment of loitering weapons platforms 




The Navy is developing a new series of systems for its time-critical strike future 
naval capability program, such as the Real Time Execution Decision Support 
(REDS) Initiative.  The Navy is also working on a network-centric warfare 
concept that will network Navy sensors, command centers, and its long-range 
weapons to attack a broader range of targets (including those in the deep battle 
area) more effectively.  This concept includes a vast array of procurement and 
research and development weapon systems, ships, aircraft, and command and 
control, communications, intelligence and reconnaissance programs.  The Navy is 
considering the need for new command and control ships to provide the Navy 
with the capability to control deployed joint forces while stationed off shore. 
(Wiggins 2001) 
 
The Office of Naval Research (ONR) is “…developing technologies that enable 
strides against targets in compressed vulnerability windows in all joint operations, in any 
environment, under all conditions.” (Office of Naval Research 2001) A multitude of 
initiatives by the ONR are discussed relative to Time Critical Strike.  A Time Critical 




The Army is continuing to fund its Battlefield Digitization initiative, which is 
designed to improve the flow of battlefield information within the Army’s fighting 
organization structure.  The Army is also developing a transformation strategy, 
which is designed to ensure that the Army could respond to a broad range of 
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operations.  The strategy centers on developing a combat force that is expected to 
be lighter, but just as powerful and survivable as today’s heavy force.  This new 
force will be planned around Future Combat systems.  These systems will provide 
the capability to attack critical targets much deeper in the battle area before they 
become a direct threat. (Wiggins 2001) 
 
3. Private Industry Perspectives 
Solutions and perspectives from private industry were also explored, such as the 
“Imagine…and act” presentation by G. Gardner, VP, Government and Homeland 
Security Solution, Oracle Corporation, which explored potentially viable architectures 
that utilize modern information technology and business processes, enabled by future 
technologies such as the Global Information Grid (GIG), to shorten the kill chain. 
(Gardner 2005) 
 
4. Additional Views 
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Special Projects 
Office (SPO) is fully engaged with the pursuit of networked targeting-based solutions for 
TCTs.  Their efforts include research in the areas of Affordable Moving Surface Target 
Engagement (AMSTE) and Advanced Tactical Targeting Technology (AT3).  Both of 
these programs are geared toward closing the gaps and tightening the coupling between 
the sensors and shooters.  In September of 2005, DARPA SPO successfully demonstrated 
Tactical Targeting Network Technology (TTNT) in tactical aircraft.  This demonstration 
is also discussed in the Expeditionary Pervasive Sensing (EPS) / Networked Sensors 
portion of this chapter; however, it warrants mention here as well, due to its enormous 
contribution toward the prosecution of TCTs.  This is a testament to how closely knitted 
these concepts are to each other.  The extent of material available regarding time critical 
targets and improving time-critical strike capabilities is enormous.  The focus of these 
studies relates to a common theme, which can be expressed (in Air Force terms) as the 




D. FUTURE NAVAL FIRES 
The Future Naval Fires concept is being developed in support of SEA STRIKE, 
which is “a broadened concept for naval power projection that leverages enhanced 
C4ISR, precision, stealth, and endurance to increase operational tempo, reach, and 
effectiveness.” (Naval Power 21 2002) SEA STRIKE is one fundamental concept of the 
Navy’s Concept of Operation (CONOP) of SEA POWER 21.  This CONOP was 
developed to guide the US Navy in aligning and accelerating its progress in offensive 
power, defensive assurance, and operational independence around the globe. 
   
SEA STRIKE operations describe how the 21st-century Navy plans to exert 
direct, decisive, and sustained influence in joint campaigns. Persistent intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance; time sensitive strike; ship-to-objective maneuver; 
information operations; and covert strike to deliver devastating power and accuracy in 
future campaigns are all a part of these developing operations.  This FNF concept is built 
around four primary pillars: 
 
1. First Pillar  
The first pillar of the FNF concept is Simultaneous Operations.  Traditional naval 
operations involved sequential phasing of battle.  Focuses were on “rolling back enemy 
capabilities, force build-ups followed by offensive action.” (NWDC 2007)  The FNF 
concept is developed for non-linear battlefields and involves conducting parallel 
operations across the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war on a non-linear 
battlefield.  
 
2. Second Pillar 
The second pillar of FNF requires setting up a Fully Netted Digital Fires Network.   
All available fires across the battlespace will be linked in an automated process, which 
will enable massed fires in unison or specific patterns. This added capability could be an 
additional option to be deployed against Time Critical Targets. 
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3. Third Pillar  
The third pillar of FNF involves possessing a capability for Organic Tactical 
Sensing.   Sensor to weapon connectivity is supported by a fully integrated sensors 
network.  The Expeditionary Pervasive Sensing concept, which includes capabilities 
starting with space based sensors and continuing all the way to sensors on the sea floor, 
will be used to develop the fully integrated network. Expeditionary Pervasive Sensing 
(EPS) is composed of multiple levels and sensors at the area and theatre stage.  Platforms 
will include both manned and unmanned systems/sensors using an Integrated Fire 
Control (IFC) system. EPS is further discussed in section E. 
 
4. Fourth pillar  
The fourth and final pillar of the FNF concept is to posses the Required 
Supporting Capabilities.  This pillar will basically focus on the enhancement of 
expeditionary organizational capabilities, war fighter training, and sustainment.  
Logisticians will need to be highly trained and highly valued to fully support the success 
of the FNF concept.  
As naval weapons systems advance, the FNF capabilities also advance.  When 
naval fires are required, “the joint task force commander will have a variety of naval 
weapons to choose from, including accurate stand-off munitions delivered from aircraft, 
gun-fired precision-guided munitions, and sophisticated ballistic and cruise missiles 
launched from surface warships and submarines.” (Rudderow 2002)  Submarines, surface 
warships, and aircraft carriers with long-range options in deploying missiles or attack 
aircraft will all be a part of the Navy’s overall SEA STRIKE capabilities, as well as the 




E. NETTED SENSORS AND EXPEDITIONARY PERVASIVE SENSING 
 
1. Evolution of Network Centric Concepts 
The evolution of Network Centric Concepts can be best described be the below 
excerpt from the Tactical Digital Information Links website, authored by J. Pike. 
 
The concept of a sensor network is nothing new to the US Navy.  The need for 
situational awareness for decision makers and the desire to have disparate forces 
operate in a coherent manner prompted the development of several technologies, 
which have come to be known as Tactical Digital Information Links (TADILs).  
This family consists of several network formats, such as Link 4A, Link-11, Link-
16, and Link-22.  Link-16 is the DoD's primary tactical data link for command, 
control, and intelligence; providing critical joint interpretability and situation 
awareness information. Link-16 uses a Time Demand Multiple Access (TDMA) 
architecture and the "J" message format standard. The "J" series of message 
standards are designated as the Department of Defense's primary tactical data 
link, according to the Joint Tactical Data Link Management Plan (JTDLMP). 
(Pike 2000) 
 
A disadvantage of the existing TADILs is the inherent latency, which can be 
measured in seconds in some cases.  This latency is not a correctable parameter, based 
primarily on the fact that the TADIL information is collected and filtered into a target 
positioning track prior to transmission.  The time that is required to do this precludes 
using the data for any functions that would require a high, consistent update rate.  
However, TADILs are very effective at distributing pertinent information and providing 
situational awareness to key decision makers, enabling timely Force-level control over a 
battle group or joint force. 
 
The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) was the next evolution in 
improving network centric operations among sea-borne platforms.  This system offers 
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several advantages over the TADIL systems.  CEC not only offers the same improved 
situational awareness advantage, but actually increases the effective battle space of 
surface combatants.  The enabler for this capability is based on a much higher speed 
network and minimum front-end processing.  Raw radar information is shared among 
Cooperating Units (CUs) and is used in conjunction with each platform’s organic sensors 
(if present) to form composite tracks, which are of higher fidelity than a track produced 
by any single platform.  In the case of remote engagements, bandwidth management 
schemes are employed to ensure required data rates are achieved to support said 
engagements.  In the larger scheme of things, the Defense Industry Daily stated that, 
“CEC is a critical hinge of the U.S. Navy’s Sea Shield and FORCEnet doctrines under 
SeaPower 21…,” which is in-line with the Stakeholder guidance provided in the SOW for 
this development effort.  Additional resources used to investigate CEC are included in the 
bibliography.  
 
2. Beyond the Status Quo 
While the Cooperative Engagement Capability is considered a huge leap in the 
direction of network centric warfare, it only addresses a small portion of the Sea Power 
21 vision.  To more completely fulfill this aspect of DoD’s transformation, the netted 
sensor concept must expand to allow for a much greater number of individual sensors, as 
well as suites of sensors.  There also must be a departure from the single star-network 
topology employed by CEC to a network of networks architecture, which will foster a 
multi-tiered command and control (C2) scheme based on roles and capabilities of the 
sensors and/or their respective platforms.  The concept of a network of networks supports 
the incorporation of a multitude of sensors, to include space-based, air, surface, and sub-
surface.  
 
The DoD thrust for Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) requirements has served 
to steer development efforts toward existing standards such as the utilization of Internet 
Protocol (IP) data formats for implementing and managing data networks.  A substantial 
amount of research based on Information Assurance (IA) has been supported by the 
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National Security Agency (NSA) and is referred to as the GIG vision.  The scope of this 
vision, “…will be a net-centric system operating in a global context to provide 
processing, storage, management, and transport of information to support all DoD, 
national security, and related Intelligence Community missions and functions-strategic, 
operational, tactical, and business-in war, in crisis, and in peace.” (NSA 2007) 
 
Currently, there are several major initiatives relating to the Global Information 
Grid listed in Aviation Daily (Adams 2005) as follows: 
• “Information Assurance (IA) 
• Horizontal Fusion, network centric demonstrations 
• Transformational Communications, sitcom 
• Family of beyond line-of-sight terminals (FAB-T), wideband sitcom 
• Transformational Satellite (TSAT), for high-volume communications 
• Teleports, links between terrestrial and satellite communications 
• GIG-Bandwidth Expansion (GIG-BE), for ground-laid optical fiber.” 
 
DARPA successfully demonstrated the Tactical Targeting Network Technology 
(TTNT) in 2005.  The system utilized “…internet protocol-based, high-speed, dynamic, 
ad hoc data-link network designed to enable tactical aircraft to quickly target moving and 
time-critical targets.” (Adams 2005)  The work conducted by DARPA supported the use 
of low-latency internet-protocol applications for transferring still images, stream video, 
cursor on target, as well as several others. 
 
3. Applicability to Time Critical Targeting 
The concept of EPS is important to time critical targets because it can improve the 
detection of time critical threats.  However, for EPS to be effective, it must be a part of a 





F. SERVICE ORIENTED ARCHITECTURE 
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) is a method of building and processing 
computer resources around services that are consumed rather than data objects.  It is a 
formal computing architecture standard managed by the Organization for the 
Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS).  OASIS formally defines 
SOA as a “…paradigm for organizing and utilizing distributed capabilities that may be 
under the control of different ownership domains” (MacKenzie and others 2006).  An 
example service that might be used in the OAWSDM would be Get Ships Heading.  This 
service would be accessible to other programs and would provide ship’s heading when 
called upon.  More information about significant entities and the relationships that might 
exist between them in a service oriented environment can be found in the Reference 
Model for Service Oriented Architecture at the committee website (MacKenzie and 
others 2006). 
 
G. TARGET ENGAGEMENT AND THE OODA MODEL 
During the Korean and Vietnam War eras, Colonel John Boyd of the United 
States Air Force developed a model that he used during aerial combat.  The model 
contained processes Boyd considered necessary to win both in aerial combat and at war 
in general.  His model was comprised of four functions: Observe, Orient, Decide, and 
Act, which form an iterative loop known as the OODA Loop.  The OODA Loop 




Figure 4.   OODA Loop Model 
The OODA Loop, as developed by Colonel John Boyd, showing the 
Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act components of the loop. The OODA loop 
is used in conjunction with the OAWSDM in this paper to model the 
engagement process for time critical targets. (Ullman 2007) 
 
Data is first collected through the use of sensor systems and human intelligence 
(HUMINT) observations.  Observation information is almost always incomplete, 
uncertain, and evolving originating from multiple different sources.  Observations of 
developing conditions have implied filtering that is based on the problem at hand 
(Ullman 2007).  These observations are the raw information which decisions and actions 
are based upon.  Before a decision is made orientation occurs and for the information to 
be oriented, the raw observed data must first be processed.  For a decision to be made, the 
decision maker desires a certain level of confidence in the amount and accuracy of the 
information collected.  There is a paradox in that one may never have all the information 
they require.  The filtering of information is typically fashioned from past experience, 
background, and varying techniques.  When Colonel Boyd developed the OODA Loop, it 
was intended for a single decision maker (i.e. a fighter pilot in combat).  Since then, this 
model has been applied to many platforms and organizations both demonstrating success 
and failure.  In organizations there are multiple decision makers whom each present their 
own past experience and techniques which vary.  If the variety is too great then comprises 
are made, bad decisions made, or no decision at all due to more analysis of data being 
sought after.  In a time critical situation, it becomes imperative that the information 
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provided for the decision making process is as complete and clear as possible to facilitate 
better and faster decisions. 
 
It is important to note that the OODA model is an iterative loop.  With each 
iteration, the process becomes refined through learning that occurs from the reaction to 
each decision and action.  This refinement allows for more efficient decision making as 
time goes on. 
 
The observations presented to the system come from multiple sources.  There are 
two problems posed during observation.  First, the observed data and information is ever 
changing, incomplete, inconsistent, uncertain, and dependent on the observation system 
or person.  Second, the collected information from multiple sources can vary.  This 
variation introduces a degree of uncertainty.  If one of the sensors presents correct 
information, the system must determine which information is correct (Ullman 2007). This 
could be especially problematic when observing time critical targets. The more sensors 
that detect a target, the more resources and time that will be required to correlate or 
“fuse” that data into an accurate track. 
 
The primary purpose of orientation is to make sense of the observations.  If the 
information is modeled for formal analysis, the decision maker is able to interpret the 
information more effectively.  Unfortunately, much of the information cannot be modeled 
easily.  It is very important that the information is managed to match the decision maker’s 
requirements (Ullman 2007).  The decision maker must be confident that the amount of 
information is sufficient and the information itself is valid.  The orientation of 
information is dependent on the viewpoint of who is interpreting them (Ullman 2007).  
The uncertainty of the information is the main driver for the OODA Loop failing to 
perform as desired.  Decision makers are unconformable with this uncertainty and fear 
the repercussions of making a bad decision. In the time critical engagement process, 
information regarding tracks should be presented in such a way as to facilitate quick 
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decision making while minimizing the likelihood of errors. There should be an 
understanding that this is not an easy task and there are no fail proof systems. 
 
Alternative courses of action are developed as a result of orientation.  Once a 
decision is made the reaction is observed and oriented in response.  Decision making is 
an iterative process of “repeatedly deciding what to do next – observe more information, 
do further orientation, or take action” (Ullman 2007).  One technique used to improve 
orientation is the prioritization of information.  At any given time there are multiple 
situations that must be dealt with, by prioritizing them the decision maker can better 
make good decisions to act upon.  Because of the uncertainty of the observations, the 
ability to manage both qualitative and quantitative information is a must.  Lastly, to 
further improve the orientation, alternative actions and possible outcomes are developed 
during the orientation process.  This allows the decision maker to consider multiple 
courses of action and the likely response. 
There are techniques that can manage the deliberation of the information for 
decision making.  The focusing of sensors on a particular area of interest can allow for 
more data and information to be gathered and presented to the decision makers.  The 
decision makers must also determine how much time to devote to data collection and 
analysis of information due to the time sensitive nature of the targets of interest.  Finally, 
separating the easy, or obvious, efforts from the difficult does facilitate the decision 
making process and allows for more time to be devoted to the more unknown targets.  
The orientation of information is fused together to aid in the decision making process. 
This fused information could be presented in the form of a Single Integrated Air or 
Ground Picture (SIAP/SIGP) displaying all the target information from the multiple 
sensors and platforms.  (Ullman 2007) 
 
Decision making is the most important process of the OODA loop.  Not making a 
decision puts the OODA loop into an endless Observe – Orient loop. This is unacceptable 
because the information being collected is time sensitive. The key takeaway from 
decision making to improve the OODA loop is to learn from past experiences and 
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decisions.  It is here where the Open Architecture Warfare System Domain Model 
(OAWSD), discussed earlier, can be improved also. Both models must refine this process 
to become more efficient.   
The act process must be consistent with the decisions that were made.  If the 
actions were not carried out properly then the loop is broken because appropriate 
feedback cannot be reiterated into the model.  Ullman points out to “associate the actions 
taken with specific OODA loops, or tasks.”  Actions are actually carried out in each of 
the processes within the OODA loop.  
Luessen demonstrates that there is an inherent relationship between the OODA 
loop and engagement models such as the Detect Control Engage (DCE) Model and the 




Figure 5.   OODA, DCE, and JDL Data Fusion Model 
The above figure was created to show the relationship between three of 
the process models used to describe target engagements. The pink blocks 
show the OODA model, the tan blocks show the Detect Control Engage 
(DCE) model and the green blocks indicate components of the JDL Data 
Fusion Model (Luessen 2003). 
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This figure demonstrates how the OODA, DCE and JDL phases relate.  It 
illustrates the idea that “control” extends into all aspects of the three models.  With 
respect to the engagement of time critical targets, figure 5 illustrates the many functions 
encapsulated in the C3 portion of the cycle.  Because of its broad coverage, combined 
with the complexity of including the many aspects of the detect and engage model, the C3 
functions were selected as the focal point for this research project. 
 
H. SUMMARY OF LITERATURE SEARCH 
The literature search was necessary to gain a better understanding of topics 
important to this research such as Open Architecture, FORCEnet, Time Critical Targets, 
Future Naval Fires, Expeditionary Pervasive Sensing, Service Oriented Architecture, and 
Target Engagement Processes. Open Architecture is a DoD requirement to enforce 
modular system design. For the simulation, this led to a modular design that enabled 
easier changes between the scenarios used as well as the baseline, improved and ideal 
models for each. FORCEnet works to optimize information flow to achieve a distributed, 
collaborative command and control infrastructure. These efficiencies in the C3 portions of 
the target engagement cycle were used to estimate segments of the simulated process. 
Current enemy capabilities require developments in support of Time Critical Targeting, 
to prosecute fast moving, maneuverable targets with a limited window of opportunity. 
Systems used against TCTs require faster, more efficient processing and a general 
understanding of this and other needs presented by this threat are necessary for the 
simulation in this study. Future Naval Fires is the doctrine guiding the development of 
new strike systems by the Navy. It focuses on improving C4ISR and combines 
simultaneous operations, a fully netted digital fires network, organic tactical sensing, and 
the required supporting capabilities to achieve this. Expeditionary Pervasive Sensing is 
one of the pillars of FNF and is focused on increasing the detection capability which, 
although not the focus of this study, would be another area of future research in its effect 
on mission effectiveness. Service Oriented Architecture focuses on bandwidth 
management, allowing the decision maker to pull relevant information instead of 
bombarding irrelevant information along with the relevant and requiring the sorting of the 
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two which slows the overall decision making process. Finally, Target Engagement 
Processes were studied in order to find a process to merge with the hierarchical structure 
of the OAWDSM, leading to the simulation used. The OODA Loop was the process used 
throughout this study, having a long history and simple implementation. Each of these 
topics led to the process and assumptions presented in this study. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE OAWSDM 
A.  SYSTEMS ENGINEERING DESIGN PROCESS 
 
 This study uses a systematic and iterative approach, governed by a mix of 
Systems Engineering Design Processes (SEDP). Significant influence, for the process 
used in this study, comes from Benjamin Blanchard and Wolter Fabrycky’s book, 
Systems Engineering and Analysis, 4th Ed. This is the Vee Model for the Systems 
Engineering Design Process and is shown in figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6.   The Vee Model for the SEDP (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2006) 
The Vee Model as presented by Blanchard and Fabrycky shows the flow of 
the initial problem decomposition and subsequent synthesis of a design 
solution. 
 
In the Vee Model, the SEDP progresses from an initial definition of system 
requirements to an allocation of system functions to subsystems of the proposed design. 
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Detail design work is then performed which leads to verification testing of those 
segments. These small segments are rolled into subsystems, again verified, and 
eventually to a full fledged system that undergoes a final verification. The horizontal 
arrows indicate the source of the verification testing, where each stage of the design is 
verified in its representation of the detail design, subsystem design, or system 
requirements, respectively. Again, this model is meant to describe the design of a system 
and not the analysis of an architecture, but with some adaptation, it will provide the basis 
of the methodology of this study. Figure 7 shows the adaptation of the previous SEDP for 
use in this study. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Architecture Analysis Vee Diagram 
 This Vee diagram has been adapted for architecture analysis, in which a 
system is not necessarily being designed as the end product, but in which a 
representative system must still be created to test the overall framework it 
is meant to be designed from. 
 
For this purpose, the construction of the system is a step along the way and while 
the system does not need to be ideal, resulting from alternative generation and value 
systems analysis, it does need to be representative of systems that are designed around 
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the architecture being studied. In order to ensure this, the architecture is broken into its 
component functions which are ordered and further decomposed so that a simulation 
model can be accurately constructed. The problem definition will lead to this and then to 
developing representative scenarios and bringing further definition to the system model. 
This is then built up into model subsystems, tested against the functional decomposition, 
and finally assembled into a working model that can utilize the scenarios to provide 
simulation results, which are then analyzed. Specifically, the steps taken are as follows: 
• Problem Definition and Enabling Technology 
o Initial Problem Definition (Section I) 
o Literature Search (Section II) 
o OAWSDM Decomposition & Analysis (Section III. B.) 
o Input-Output Analysis (Section III. C.) 
o Scope and Bounds Analysis (Section III. D.) 
• Functional Analysis & Allocation (Section III. E.) 
o Context Diagram 
o Functional Flow  
• Scenario Development  
o Operational View (Section IV. B.) 
o Metrics Definition (Section IV. C.) 
o OATCTEP Model Scenario Definition (Section IV. D.) 
o OATCTEP Model & Scenario Assumptions (Section IV. E.) 
• Synthesize Model Blocks & Subsystems 
o Radar Model Design (Section IV. F.) 
o System Model Design (Section IV. G.) 
• Run Scenarios 
o OATCTEPM Simulation Results Analysis & Evaluation (Section V.) 
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B.  OPEN ARCHITECTURE WEAPONS SYSTEM DOMAIN MODEL 
 DECOMPOSITION 
The OAWSD model as depicted in figure 2 is comprised of nine primary 
functions: 
 1.0 Search/Detect 
• 2.0 Data/Information Systems 
• 3.0 Planning, Assessment, and Decision 
• 4.0 Weapon/Asset Services 
• 5.0 Mission Execution 
• 6.0 External Communication 
• 7.0 Common Services 
• 8.0 Training 
• 9.0 Force Planning/Communication 
 
 
Figure 2, The OA Warfare System Domain Model, Repeated for Clarity 
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1. Search / Detect (S/D)  
The search/detect partition includes the systematic surveillance by sensors of a 
defined area, and the observation (detection) of an object or entity of possible interest.  
These sensors include but are not limited to radars, electronic warfare support (ES) 
sensors, intelligence gathering sensors, electro-optical (EO) or infrared (IR) sources, 
acoustic sources, and identification friend-or-foe (IFF). 
 
The S/D functional component utilizes local sensors to detect contacts. Sensor 
track positional reports and intelligence (INTEL) reports are distributed over the LAN for 
other users.  S/D will accept track cues from other remote units and task local sensors to 
search and detect for possible threats. 
 
The Search / Detect function consists of the following components: 
1.1 Sensor Assets are the physical input mechanisms to the system.  They detect 
targets and send data to the system tracker.  These assets include different 
radar systems, sonar, EO/IR sensors, electronic intelligence (ELINT), and any 
other type of detection equipment. 
1.2 Sensor Reports contain current operational status updates of the netted 
sensors. 
1.3 Sensor Track Reports provide target telemetry, such as relative location 
(range), radial velocity, and elevation, or depth to the system tracker. 
1.4 INTEL Reports are provided to decision makers to aid in placement of 
ordinance and locations of high profile targets of interest. 
1.5 Measurement Reports are used by maintenance technicians for assistance in 
troubleshooting and repair activities of sensor systems. 
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The outputs of the Search / Detect (S/D) function state what sensor assets are 
available, provide reports on sensors including detections, track reports from sensors 
including positions, and report on INTEL and measurement reports. 
 
Data is also shared between other functions in the OAWSD model.  The output 
data from Search / Detect (S/D) function is provided to the 2.0 Data / Information 
Services (DIS) and 7.0 Common Services (CS) functions via the local OACE network 
LAN.  The Search / Detect (S/D) function inputs data from 2.0 Data / Information 
Services (DIS), 7.0 Common Services (CS), and the 8.0 Training (TR) functions via the 
local OACE network LAN. 
 
2.  Data / Information Services (DIS)  
Data/Information Services (DIS) is the repository for all track data and non-
kinematic information, and is responsible for sensor coordination.  The DIS functional 
component will maintain all time critical system track data for real time (RT) and near 
real time (NRT) tracks, including kinematics, identification, class, Link-Track Number, 
and primary and secondary source information. DIS will distribute time critical track data 
over LAN for other users. 
 
The DIS function is comprised of the following sub functions and applications: 
2.1 System Track is a correlation of sensor tracks into a single integrated display 
that is presented to the user. 
2.2 Supporting Source Tracks are used if the primary sensor fails or is off-line 
then the next best track quality is provided from an additional sensor. 
2.3 Classifications of tracks are labeled as either surface, airborne, or undersea 
targets.  Tracks are also the identified as either threat, friendly, or unknown. 
2.4 Track Kinematics are those that describe the motion of the track, information 
presented as velocity, heading, altitude (if applicable) relative to user. 
2.5 Attribute Data function associates the data to a specific sensor, weapon 
system, or platform. 
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2.6 Track Repository is the storage of track information in the form of a history 
log used to playback in either training scenarios or investigation of an 
incident. 
2.7 NRT INTEL Tracks provide INTEL information to commanders and decision 
makers.  These are used to build a trend of threat movement and capabilities. 
2.8 Sensor Scheduler is used lay out the plan of operations and preventative 
maintenance of the sensor subsystems. 
 
The DIS function outputs system and supporting source tracks.  The function also 
provides the classification of the threat, kinematics of the track, attribute data, and NRT 
INTEL track data.  The function also acts as the scheduler for the sensors in the system. 
 
The Data / Information Services (DIS) function also provides data to other 
functions while utilizing data from various functions.  The data provided by the DIS 
function is used by the 1.0 Search / Detect (S/D), 3.0 Planning, Assessment & Decision 
(PAD), 4.0 Weapon / Asset Services (W/AS), 6.0 EXCOMM, and the 7.0 Common 
Services (CS) functions via the local OACE network LAN.  The DIS function also makes 
use of data from the 1.0 Search / Detect (S/D), 3.0 Planning, Assessment & Decision 
(PAD), 6.0 EXCOMM, and the 7.0 Common Services (CS) functions via the local OACE 
network LAN. 
 
3. Planning, Assessment & Decision (PAD) 
The PAD directs and coordinates execution of the following warfare areas: Anti-
Air Warfare (AAW), Strike Warfare (STW), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW), Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW), Amphibious Warfare (AMW), Mine Warfare (MW), Naval 
Special Warfare (NSW), and Command and Control Warfare (C2W). The PAD 
functional component directs execution of all of the various warfare areas, perform threat 
assessments, and accept Command and Control orders. 
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The PAD function consists of the following sub functions and applications: 
3.1 Assigned Missions contain the lists and details of current, upcoming, and 
previously designated missions. 
3.2 Tactical Picture provides a current layout of the battle space to local force 
commanders and decision makers. 
3.3 Action Plans are the details of upcoming missions and actions. 
3.4 Capability is the current competence of system due to limitations or 
availability of various sensors and weapon systems. 
3.5 Plan is a list of events and tasks to be accomplished. 
3.6 Mission Assessment is the analysis of completed and in-progress missions 
that is analyzed and used for future mission planning. 
3.7 Threat Assessment (Including Identity) includes the level of potential threat 
to mission and allied forces.  The assessment also identifies specifically what 
the threat is and its capabilities. 
3.8 Command & Control (C2) Order, Schedule & Event function programs the 
tasks to C2 operators according to a hierarchal scheme. 
  
The PAD function provides the mission assignment and tactical picture of the 
battlespace to the user.  The PAD function also supplies plans of action, assessment of 
mission, identity of threat, and the assessment of threat.  In addition to these the function 
also provides C2 order, schedule, and event. 
 
The function supplies data via the local OACE network LAN to the 1.0 Search / 
Detect (S/D), 4.0 Weapon / Asset Services (W/AS), 6.0 EXCOMM, 7.0 Common 
Services (CS), and the 8.0 Training (TR) functions.  Data is provided to the PAD function 
via the local OACE network LAN from the 1.0 Search / Detect (S/D), 4.0 Weapon / 





4. Weapon / Asset Services (W/AS) 
W/AS is the controlling function for all shipboard and shipboard-controlled assets 
within Mission Execution, and the coordination function for other BF W/AS-enabled 
assets.  W/AS in general develops and schedules all actions to be taken.  W/AS directs 
weapons assets, remote vehicle assets, and ship’s Hull, Mechanical & Electrical (HM&E) 
assets. 
 
Controls and coordinates all shipboard and shipboard controlled assets included in 
the mission execution block.  Also provides weapon, remotely controlled vehicle (RV), 
navigation (NAV), and engineering to the system. 
 
The W/AS function is made up of the following sub functions and applications for 
weapons, remotely controlled vehicles (RV), navigation (NAV), and engineering 
systems: 
4.1 The Action function controls the actions of assets such as radiate, safe, fire, 
etc. 
4.2 The Schedule application controls the schedule of weapon systems and assets 
such as when preventative maintenance and overhaul occurs. 
4.3 The Event utility provides status report for the weapon systems, navigation, 
remote controlled vehicles, and engineering assets to system. 
 
The function supplies data via the local OACE network LAN to the 3.0 Planning, 
Assessment & Decision (PAD), 5.0 Mission Execution (ME), 6.0 EXCOMM, and the 7.0 
Common Services (CS) functions.  Data is provided to the W/AS function via the local 
OACE network LAN from the 2.0 Data / Information Services (DIS), 3.0 Planning, 





5. Mission Execution (ME) 
The ME function is comprised of the specific ship and RV execution assets, 
including weapons, RV assets, and other ship assets.  The Weapon assets include missiles 
(air/surface/land), guns, torpedoes, decoys/electronic attack, etc.  The RV assets include 
controlled aircraft, boats, and unmanned vehicles.  The Ship assets include engineering, 
damage control, and the integrated bridge. The function maintains all weapons, remote 
vehicle, ship and communications assets. 
 
The Mission Execution function is made up of three primary OA platform-unique 
function/applications with sub-functions and assets. 
5.1 Weapons Systems are used to place ordinance upon designate threats. 
5.1.1 Air/Surface Missiles are launched from land, sea, or subsurface 
platforms. 
5.1.2 Land Attack Missiles are fired from land, sea, air, or subsurface 
platforms. 
5.1.3 Torpedoes are deployed from air, sea, or subsurface platforms. 
5.1.4 Guns are fired from sea, air or land systems. 
5.1.5 Decoys are countermeasures used for evasive actions or to draw 
out threats from seclusion.  Decoys are available in a multitude of 
forms and capable of being deployed from all platforms. 
5.2 Remote Controlled Vehicle (RV) Assets are used for reconnaissance, 
placement of ordinance, and the acquisition and transmission of INTEL. 
5.2.1 Aircraft are used to fly over areas of interest and photograph 
potential targets.  The aircraft is also capable to carrying a limited 
amount of ammunition. 
5.2.2 Boats are used for reconnaissance and the gathering of INTEL. 
5.2.3 An Un-Manned Vehicle such as a robot is used to investigate 
possible threats like improvised explosive devices (IED) and other 
missions where deemed useful. 
5.3 Engine Control System directs the operation of propulsion for the platforms. 
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5.3.1 The Engineering component includes propulsion and life support 
systems. 
5.3.2 The Damage function provides status resulting from damage due to 
enemy fire, friendly fire, weather, system failure, and navigation 
hazards 
5.3.3 The Bridge is the central control center where the status and the 
control of the engineering systems are located. 
 
6. External Communication (EXCOMM) 
This partition represents the link between the combat system and the various data 
and information sources available both within and external to the force.  The External 
Communication (EXCOMM) function is a conduit responsible for sending and receiving 
track data, planning information, Intelligence (INTEL), etc., to and from other units in the 
battle force (BF), battle group (BG), or entities external to the BF/BG. It represents the 
link between the combat system and the various data sources within and external to Battle 
Force; responsible for sending/receiving track data, mission plans, intelligence to and 
from other units in the Battle Force. 
 
The EXCOMM function consists of three OA common functions including the 
Common Services Action, Network Schedule, and Message Event functions.  The 
EXCOMM also contains four OA platform-unique components such as Network, Radios, 
Sat COM, and Data Links. 
6.1 Communications Service Action is an OA common function that enables 
communication between decision makers and war fighters. 
6.2 Network Schedule is the OA common function that allocates time to systems 
and users for communication in order to manage bandwidth. 
6.3 Message Events are an OA common function that provides users, 
commanders, and decision makers the status of system assets. 
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6.4 Network is an OA platform-unique application that provides means for 
simultaneous communications between multiple users rather than point-to-
point. 
6.5 Data Links is the OA platform-unique application that allows for data and 
information to be shared, or transferred, between weapons systems, sensors, 
and other system assets. 
6.6 Radios are the OA platform-unique systems allow communication between 
war fighters the battlespace or local operational theatre. 
6.7 Sat COM is the OA platform-unique system that provides communication 
between war fighter and decision makers around the world via satellites. 
 
The outputs of the EXCOMM function include track data, planning information 
as well as INTEL.  Data from the EXCOMM function is distributed to the 1.0 Data / 
Information Services (DIS), 3.0 Planning, Assessment & Decision (PAD), 4.0 Weapon / 
Asset Services (W/AS), 7.0 Common Services (CS), 8.0 Training (TR) functions through 
the local OACE network LAN.  Data is also provided to the 9.0 Force Planning / 
Coordination (FP/C) function on the Force Network.  Data is received from the 1.0 Data / 
Information Services (DIS), 3.0 Planning, Assessment & Decision (PAD), 4.0 Weapon / 
Asset Services (W/AS), 7.0 Common Services (CS) functions through the local OACE 
network LAN.  Data is also provided to the EXCOMM function from the 9.0 Force 
Planning / Coordination (FP/C) function via the Force Network.   
 
7. Common Services (CS)  
The Common Services (CS) Partition consists of the following: Databases, 
Display, Time, Data Extraction/Data Reduction (DX/DR), Environment, Navigation 
(NAV), and Utilities.  These represent those services within and across the combat 
system, unit, and BF that are common. 
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This function represents all services within the Combat level, Unit or Battle Force 
Level that are common to the system.  The function is comprised of six OA common 
function/applications. 
7.1 Displays provide users with real-time tactical display of targets and system 
status. 
7.2 The Navigation (NAV) function aides the user with position, velocity, 
heading, and bearing information integrated with targets, land masses, 
weather, depth, and if applicable, altitude. 
7.3 Databases contain information used to build scenarios for prediction of events 
such as weather conditions, collision avoidance, etc. 
7.4 The Time function provides the system with synchronous timing for assets, 
war fighters and decision makers. 
7.5 Data Extraction / Data Reduction (DX/DR) function is used for in-depth data 
analysis of specific areas of interest.  This tool provides analysts and 
engineers a better look at why a fault or event has occurred within a system or 
subsystem. 
7.6 The Environment application factors in environmental conditions and 
potential impacts to system and war fighters. 
 
Outputs for the function involve display, navigation (NAV), database, and 
environmental information as well as time and data extraction & reduction.  Data is 
provided to and received from all functions in the OAWSD. 
 
8. Training (TR) 
This partition provides for scenario generation, exercise control from own ship 
and remote stations afloat and ashore, and training playback and analysis tools to assess 
the battle readiness of the force, unit, and individual.  The scope of training addresses 
total ship mission training requirements for the tactical system team/operator, 




The TR Partition provides for the planning, conduct, assessment, and 
management of readiness information for training.  It represents an embedded force 
training capability available pier-side and underway for training (a) the battle force, (b) 
ships from a total ship perspective, (c) individual own-ship teams, and (d) the individual 
operators.  It will support individual operator training through interactive lesson-based 
training, as well as supporting training of operator teams and sub-teams within a single 
platform, and multi-platform training through interactive scenario-based training. 
 
The Training (TR) function is made up of three main OA common function / 
applications and three applications that are used in the main functions. 
8.1 The Training Action, Schedule & Event function controls when, where, and 
with what resources the war fighters use to simulate battle conditions. 
8.1.1 A Simulator is used to replicate the actions, schedules, and events 
used in the training system. 
8.2 Synthetic Actions are provided to the war fighter and commander for use in 
the training system. 
8.2.1 A Simulator is used to synthesize the actions the war fighter and 
commander is to enact upon. 
8.3 Synthetic Entities are used to provide the system with synthetic test targets to 
practice using the weapon system, communication, and sensor controls. 
8.3.1 The Scenario function supplies user with various situations to be 
used for training purposes. 
 
The main output of the training function is an assessment of battle readiness.  
Data from the Training function is supplied to the 1.0 Search / Detect (S/D), 3.0 
Planning, Assessment & Decision (PAD), 5.0 Mission Execution (ME) and 7.0 Common 
Services (CS) functions through the local OACE network LAN.  The Training (TR) 
function receives data from the 3.0 Planning, Assessment & Decision (PAD) and the 6.0 
EXCOMM functions on the local OACE network LAN. 
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9. Force Planning / Coordination (FP/C)  
FP/C enables the coordination of and collaboration among own-ship and Battle 
Force (BF) assets to perform a particular mission.  This function performs coordination 
between warfare areas as well as coordination / de-confliction within a warfare area (e.g. 
STW using missiles, manned aircraft, or guns).  This function also generates, assigns, 
manages, and implements force orders for all defined mission areas.  It assesses the plan 
and performs rapid re-planning as necessary.  FP/C also allocates specific assets to 
operations or missions, and provides initial mission conduct guidance to assets 
 
The Force Planning / Coordination function provides mission coordination at the 
Battle Force level; processes Force Orders; assesses the mission plan and provides re-
planning as needed. 
 
This function includes six OA platform-unique function/applications. 
9.1 Joint Battle Force (BF) Orders are provided to the joint war fighters with 
actions to be accomplished. 
9.2 The Commanders Estimate provides the decision makers with an estimation 
of battlespace size, threat conditions and assessment. 
9.3 The Common Operating Area (COA) Repository retains historical 
information to be used for evaluation, analysis, and future decision making. 
9.4 The Battle Group (BG) Orders supplies participants in the Battle Group with 
orders for the current mission. 
9.5 The Force Integrated Schedule is a plan of actions for local, joint and 
coalition forces. 
 
The function outputs the coordination between warfare areas and de-confliction 
within warfare area.  Force orders for all defined mission areas are provided as output 
from the function.  The FP/C function also produces planning and re-planning and 
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allocation of specific assets to operations or missions.  The initial mission conduct 
guidance to assets and assessment of mission plan is also presented by the function. 
 
Data is provided to and received from the 6.0 EXCOMM function on the Force 
Network and the 7.0 Common Services (CS) function on the local OACE network LAN. 
 
10. OAWSDM Analysis 
After decomposing the OAWSDM, it is interesting to note several key issues that 
will be relevant to the functional decomposition and evaluation of the model. First, the 
system provides some limitations on which functions can communicate with one another. 
For example, the Search/Detect function has two way communications with only the 
Data/Information Services function. There are systems which may want to rely on 
unprocessed, raw data from the sensors in order to function. The lack of direct 
connectivity between the sensing function and the communications function also 
precludes sharing of raw data outside of the system. Second, the system provides no 
health monitoring, diagnostic/prognostic function or interface status.  While this is not the 
focus of this study, being aware of the system degradation due to hardware or software 
failure can directly impact the availability and effectiveness of the detect, control, and 
engagement process.  It is understood that a system built within the OAWSDM may 
include elements not explicitly shown in the model such as built in test, but by not 
including it in the model, the possibility exists that a system constructed within this 
architecture will lack that capability.  While these observations do not contribute to the 
development of the model in this study, they should be considered in the development of 
an improved OAWSDM-based system. 
 
C. INPUT – OUTPUT ANALYSIS 
To clarify the problem space, an Input-Output analysis was conducted.  Since the 
OAWSDM is complex and designed to perform multiple functions, it is important to 
understand the desired inputs and outputs in relation to the specific surface TCT problem 
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at hand.  The Input-Output analysis represented the system architecture collecting raw 
data and processing it as it completes its mission of intercepting time critical targets.   
 
Three inputs were defined: awareness, planning and availability data.  Awareness 
data consists of sensory information provided by both organic and remote sensors used to 
detect incoming TCT threats.  Planning data, which includes the battle group 
configuration and rules of engagement, provide the basis upon which TCT engagement 
plans are determined.  Finally, availability data defines what sense, control and engage 
assets are available to employ against the TCT.   Two primary outputs were defined: 
ordnance on target, which refers to the actual desired output of a TCT kill and target data, 
which refers to data sent to other platforms.  These inputs and outputs are used to 
construct an OAWSDM TCT context diagram. 
 




Battle Group Configuration 
Rules of Engagement 
Availability Data 
Outputs Ordnance on Target 
Target Data 
 
Table 1.   Desired Inputs and Outputs of the OAWSDM 
 
D.  SCOPE AND BOUNDS ANALYSIS 
The Scope and Bounds Analysis is meant to provide a framework within which to 
analyze the problem space. In order to scope the problem, the identifiable needs are laid 
out. These are the concrete things that the resultant model of the architecture, must 
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provide. For the time critical targeting problem, certain scopes and bounds were needed 
to limit the problem to a manageable study. These are detailed in table 2. 
 
Process Bounds Scope 
OATCTEPM The OATCTEPM will model 
the detect-control-engagement 
process as bounded below. The 
model is designed for use with 
two scenarios involving surface 
TCTs. The model is limited to a 
single ship’s engagement during 
a single scenario that can then 
be analyzed in multiple 
replicates. 
Uses notional versions of weapon 
systems used on a modern cruiser 
type ship and employs technology 
readily useable in 2007. 
Created using Arena software 
package. 
Uncertainty is modeled using 
uniform or normal distributions 
around a notional average value 
for a process. 
Model Analysis The analysis of the model 
created to study the OAWSDM 
will focus on the C3 portion of 
the Detect, Control, and Engage 
paradigm. The model will be 
run using scenarios developed 
for surface based TCTs.  
Determine the overall 
effectiveness of the OAWSDM 
with respect to TCTs. 
Create a model that would allow 
analysis of an integrated combat 
system, which adheres to this 




Engagement begins at target 
detection, with the Detection 
Process. At this point, target is 
unknown until classification is 
performed. It ends with either 
the target reaching keepout 
range or a target hard kill. 
Engagement takes place aboard a 
single cruiser type vessel. 
If target reaches keepout range, it 
is declared a leaker and no battle 
damage assessment is made. 
Target is either destroyed or is not 
hit; there is no soft kill or 
disabling. 
Detection Detection process will begin at 
initial target detection as the 
maximum detection range is 
breached by incoming enemy 
vessel. It ends at handoff to ship 
control systems  
Detection process and capability 
are constant throughout analysis. 
Detection capability is based on 
common scientific principles 
employed in the design and 
implementation of all surface 
search radar systems. 
Control The control process consists of 
the command, control and 
communication process and is 
bounded by the interfaces 
between functions defined in 
the OAWSDM. 
The C3 function lies between the 
Detect and Engage functions and 
includes many activities that 
require human interaction.  These 
activities are bounded by specific 
functions - Validate Target, 
Identify Target, Threat Evaluation, 
Assign Target Priority, Mission 
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Evaluation, Weapon Assignment, 
and Plan Approval. These 
functions map directly to the 
OAWSDM. 
Engage The engage process begins with 
weapon assignment and runs to 
the completion of the overall 
process, the kill evaluation. 
Engagement processes and 
capabilities are constant 








E.  FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
The functional analysis conducted in this study leverages on the information 
collected in the problem definition phase.  This phase begins with the construction of an 
Architecture Flow Context Diagram (AFCD).  The figure below illustrates the system in 
its environment of terminators (Hatley, Hruschka, and Pirbhai, 2000).  This context 
diagram serves as the foundation for the development of the functional flow diagrams. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Time Critical Target Architecture Flow Context Diagram  
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Additional processes influenced the development of the functional flow, such as 
the DCE and JDL model pictured in figure 5, using the OODA Loop as a foundation. The 
fusion of these paradigms with the context diagram above, serve as the basis for the 
functional flow analysis.  This analysis is necessary to transform the OAWSDM 
architecture into a form that can be readily used to create a process simulation using the 
Arena software package. The OATCTEPM that results is used to analyze the 








1. Function Flow Analysis 
Once this basic context is defined, a functional flow block diagram is constructed 
for each segment of the process.  This process view illustrates the functions in the order 
in which they occur as well as how data moves through the system defined by the 
OAWSDM. These diagrams then provide the basis for the OATCTEPM as it is 
constructed in Arena.  This model, as described in section IV of this paper, provided a 
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detailed analysis of the OAWSDM effectiveness against time critical targeting scenarios 




Figure 9.   Functional Flow Block Diagram for Observe 
This is the functional flow for the Observe function. Beginning with the 
receipt of initial data, sensors are tasked to acquire further detail so that a 
target can be located and classified. This process terminates at either the 





Figure 10.   Functional Flow Block Diagram for Orient 
This is the functional flow for the Orient function. Beginning with the 
receipt of tracks from the Observe function, data is fused from multiple 







Figure 11.   Functional Flow Block Diagram for Decide 
This is the functional flow for the Decide function. Beginning with the 
verified target from the Orient function, ship capabilities are evaluated 
based on the target and necessary planning is conducted for interception 
of the target. This process terminates with the selection of a weapon 





Figure 12.   Functional Flow Block Diagram for Act 
This is the functional flow for the Act function. Beginning with the 
weapons selection in the Decide function, ship assets are directed to 
intercept the target. Weapons are launched and a kill assessment is made, 
resulting in further engagements as necessary. 
 
The functional analysis performed provides the foundation needed to construct a 
simulation model of a TCT engagement framed by the OAWSDM architecture. This 
framework is used to show a notional process that was transformed into the 
OATCTEPM, as described in Appendix II. This simulation allows the system flow to be 
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IV. MODEL DESIGN 
A. MODELING GOALS 
Based on the functional analysis, a model was developed in Arena to fully 
represent the functionality of the OAWSDM during the time critical engagements 
described in Appendix I.  This model, the OATCTEPM, was developed to provide 
simulated results similar enough to a possible future implementation of the OAWSDM 
that a comparison could be performed with an improved version of the simulated system.  
The OAWSDM was used as a basis for development of the OATCTEPM created in 
Arena.  Research concerning time-critical targeting, as presented in the Literature Search 
section of this paper, was also used in the development of the model to ensure the focus 
remains on the unique issues posed by time-critical targets. 
 
All of the functional blocks within the OAWSDM have been represented in the 
OATCTEPM with exception of 8.0 Training.   The other eight functional blocks of the 
OAWSDM are:  1.0 Search/Detect, 2.0 Data/Information Services, 3.0 Planning, 
Assessment, and Decision, 4.0 Weapon/Asset Services, 5.0 Mission Execution, 6.0 
External Communications, 7.0 Common Services, and 9.0 Force Planning/Coordination. 
Each of the model blocks within the OATCTEPM has been mapped into one of these 8 
functional blocks of the OAWSDM. A full explanation of each model block along with 
process flow diagrams of the model is contained in Appendix II and shows the 
categorization of each model block into the functional blocks of the OAWSDM. 
 
B. OPERATIONAL VIEW 
In order to better understand the totality of the scenarios presented for evaluation 
of the OAWSDM, an operational view, known as an OV-1, was developed (DODAF 
2007). This OV-1 shows the cruiser as the focal point of the scenario. In this 
representation of the second scenario detailed in Appendix I, it is surrounded by a 
number of different threats, all radially inbound. The cruiser is effectively on its own for 
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the immediate confrontation, although a similar ship is in the region and can be signaled 
for assistance after the initial assault. The cruiser possesses two attack helicopters which 




Figure 13.   Operational View (OV-1) for TCT scenarios 
The above OV-1 represents the second scenario presented in Appendix I. 







C. METRICS DEFINITION 
 
1. Introduction 
In order to conduct a meaningful evaluation of the OAWSDM, an instantiation 
was developed and is the basis for the model presented in this project. This is based on 
the projected development of the system and combined with the OODA target 
engagement model.  The simulation model is complex; therefore figure 14 is offered as a 





Figure 14.   Simplified Concept of Model 
The yellow (highlighted) section of the figure indicates the area of interest 
for the analysis effort – it is the Command, Control and Communications 
(C3) conduit.  
 
The development of Measures of Performance (MOPs) and Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOEs) is dependent on the situation being studied. Due to the complexity 
of the model used in this study, the performance qualities of the system are classified into 
more narrow groups, which contain quantities that have some common denominator 
(Cohen, Lapid, and Gur 2000) against which the effectiveness of the OAWSDM can be 
evaluated. The following sections describe the development of these evaluation measures. 
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2. Baseline Model MOPs 
Upon creation of the OATCTEPM, the first step in analyzing its effectiveness was 
to run a baseline case for each scenario. These results were used to examine the first set 
of Measures of Performance. These MOPs are listed below:  
Time Segment Description Functional Flow 
Designation 
Validate Target Time Validate target time is the 
time needed from firm track 
to target validation. 
16.2 Validate Target 
Identify Target Time Identify target time is the 
time required from validation 
of the target to identifying the 
target. 
16.0 Identify Target 
Threat Evaluation Time Threat evaluation time is the 
time consumed between 
identifying target and threat 
evaluation of the target. 
19.0 Evaluate Threat 
Assign Target Priority Time 
 
Assign target priority time is 
the time required once threat 
evaluation is final to the 
completion of assigning the 
target a priority. 
16.1 Classify Target 
Mission Evaluation Time 
 
Mission evaluation time is the 
time needed to evaluate the 
mission as a go or no go and 
starts directly after the target 
is assigned a priority and ends 
after the mission evaluation is 
complete. 
18.0 Evaluate Mission 
Weapon Assignment Time Weapon assignment time is 
the time required to assign a 
weapon to a target and starts 
once mission evaluation is 
completed and only if the 
mission is evaluated as a 
mission go. 
22.0 Select Weapon 
Plan Approval Time Plan approval time is the time 
required to review weapon 
assignments made by the 
platform and to acquire 
approval by the leader of the 
platform. 
21.0 Develop Plan 
Individual Component Times 
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After the data was collected, the MOPs were used to determine which segments of the 
overall engagement process would yield the most benefit from possible improvement.  
 
3. Total C3I Time MOP 
A sum of the data associated with the MOPs listed in table 3 is used to compare 
the baseline model performance to that of any improved concepts. The C3I time, in 
seconds (s), is defined as the time from the initiation of the “Firm Track” process block to 
the completion of the “Direct Engagement to Weapon” process block in the 
OATCTEPM: 
 
Total C3I = Validate Target + Identify Target + Threat Evaluation + Assign Target 




Figure 15.   Time-based MOP formulation for FIAC scenarios 
The above figure describes the formulation of the Measures of 
Performance used for the analysis of the simulation. 
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4. Measures of Effectiveness 
The primary measure of effectiveness for the scenarios is the probability of a 
target making it past the defending ship’s defenses, known herein as the probability of a 
leaker. Mathematically, this is shown in the below equation, where the probability of a 
leaker, PL, is defined as the number of targets not intercepted in a given scenario divided 
by the total number of targets: 
 
Trial in the Targets ofNumber  Total




From this, another MOE can be defined as the complement to the probability of 
leakers, the probability of raid annihilation, PRA.  The probability of raid annihilation is 
defined in the below equation, where it is merely 
 
LRA PP −= 1  
 
This represents the probability of intercepting all the incoming targets in a given scenario.  
 
The model results are comprised of numerous individual runs and as such, the 
MOEs are presented as averages of those runs. Hence, it is also desirable to not only 
examine the average of the runs but to examine the distribution as well. For this purpose, 
a third MOE was defined: probability of success, PSUC. This MOE is defined as the 
number of trials where there are no leakers (and hence raid annihilation was achieved) 
divided by the total number of trials: 
 
TrialsofNumber Total




While a low probability of leakers leads to a high probability of raid annihilation, this 
MOE shows how often raid annihilation is, indeed, achieved.  
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5. MOE and MOP Comparison 
As a final step, the C3I time and the MOEs defined in the previous subsection will 
be compared graphically. This analysis will plot the C3I time as an independent variable 
and the probability of raid annihilation and success as the dependant variables. By 
performing this analysis, some relationship can be developed to assist in the identification 
of the MOEs vary as a function of the C3I time. 
 
6. Use of MOEs in the OATCTEPM 
The OATCTEPM is designed to record the data required to evaluate the MOEs.  
The MOEs will demonstrate the effectiveness of the OAWSDM for each of the time-
critical targeting scenarios and suggest what level of improvement may be necessary to 
yield the desired state. The data recorded by the Arena model consists of the following: 
• Total number of kills 
• Total time from detect to completion (whether target kill or target within 
keepout range) 
• Number of kills by each weapon (Gun Weapons System, Close In 
Weapons System,  Precision Attack Missile, and Harpoon) 
• Number of targets within keepout range.   
 
The statistics for each of these pieces of data are kept and recorded throughout the 
simulation runs.  The results of the data recording are used to calculate the MOEs. 
 
D. MODEL SCENARIO DEFINITION 
Two different TCT scenarios are developed to provide the context to run the 
OATCTEPM and evaluate the OAWSDM against small boat attacks.  The parameters of 
the model change according to the specific scenario being run through the model.  The 
two scenarios and all details of the scenarios are described in Appendix I.  Some of 
parameters that are defined in each scenario are target type, target speed, target range, 
and target identification parameters. 
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The first scenario described in Appendix I is an attack by a group of Type-I fast 
inshore attack craft (FIAC).  A Type I FIAC is a two-man personal watercraft armed with 
a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launcher and/or a large blast bomb.  The Type-I FIAC 
has an effective weapon range of 0.5 km.  There will be four groups of two personal 
watercraft attacking the cruiser, each starting at a range of 3 km and traveling inbound 
with a velocity of 40 km/h. Two armed helicopters carrying eight Hellfire missiles each 
have been deployed before the start of the scenario but will not be part of this 
engagement. 
 
The second scenario described in Appendix I is a FIAC saturation attack.  The 
attack will consist of twenty Type-I FIAC, twenty Type-II FIAC, and ten Type-III FIAC.  
Type-II FIAC represents an Iranian Boghammar craft with a weapon range of 9 km.  
Type-III FIAC represents a C-14 Cat-class catamaran missile boat with a weapon range 
of 15 km.   
 
E. MODEL AND SCENARIO ASSUMPTIONS 
 
1. Rules of Engagement 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) provide the basis of acceptable engagement practices 
for naval ships to ensure that operations remain in agreement with national objectives and 
policy.  In “Naval Rules of Engagement: Management Tools for Crisis”, ROEs are 
described as standing orders that, “…specify under what circumstances force may be 
used to achieve political and military objectives” (Hayes 1989). Due to the ROEs, the 
timeliness of utilized force can dramatically impact a ship’s ability to respond in a time-
critical situation. It is not the intent of this study to conduct a detailed examination of 
naval ROEs and their impact on the TCT engagement; however the ROEs can play a 
crucial role they can play in the successful engagement of a TCT.  For the purposes of 
this study, it is assumed that a ship’s ROE allow it to engage threats from small enemy 
boats described within the scenarios and support the command and control and 
engagement as represented in the OATCTEPM. 
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2. ROE Based Assumptions 
Following is a brief description of ROE related assumptions used in the scenarios 
and model: 
 
Rules of Engagement Assumptions 
Intelligence supports that a small-boat attack is highly likely and rules of engagement 
have been clearly defined allowing ships to engage threatening targets 
All in-bound surface targets traveling greater than 35 knots are considered a threat 
In-bound threats are tracked and engaged prior to reaching the defined keep out range for 
the target 
Outbound entities are considered non-threatening 
The ship has the capability to identify a target and distinguish its type (I, II or III as 
defined in the scenario description) based on the target’s radar cross section, speed and 
behavior 
All nations who operate surface vessels in the area have been warned that directly 
approaching a US vessel at high speeds without prior authorization and identification 
validation results in engagement and destruction of the inbound vessel 
The ship is operating in condition modified Zebra and transitions to Zebra upon detection 
of a threatening in-bound target 
Based on threats, all US naval vessels closely monitor local traffic within a 100 km radius 
and are looking for any patterns of behavior that may indicate organization or potential 
attack including but not limited to trailing, running parallel courses, slowly approaching 
the vessel, loitering 
Friendly forces are actively monitoring local communications chatter 
 
Table 3.   Assumptions Derived from the Model Rules of Engagement 
3. Scenario Assumptions 
In the development of the two scenarios used in this research, assumptions were 
defined for the types of targets and the defending ship’s capabilities. The assumptions are 
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detailed, beginning with those that are common to both scenarios examined. Scenario 
specific assumptions follow, along with assumptions specific to the weapons systems 
employed in the scenarios. 
General Scenario Assumptions 
Platform is a single CG(X) 
All initial detections utilize a modern surface radar system 
Target Assumptions 
 size (height in feet) speed (knots) weapon range (km) 
Type I small (3') 40 0.5 
Type II medium (10') 40 9 
Type III large (25') 50 15 
All targets are considered small, medium, or large 
Each target type has only one weapon range 
Once the target reaches its weapon range, the target is considered a leaker and is recorded as a 
failure for the CG(X) 
Based on the general makeup of the area of operation 65% of entities are friendly, 10% are 
hostile, 25% are unknown 
For specific scenarios, all targets are considered to be hostile 
Unknown targets are repeatedly interrogated until identity is resolved 
No unknown vessels are engaged 
Targets are assigned priority according to target type and distance from keep out range 
A higher priority is assigned to targets if they are within 1 km of own ship 
Mission evaluation may send target away from CG(X) and to another platform but the 
scenarios assume that mission evaluation always results in a mission go 
Weapon assignment normally occurs according to target range, but weapon assignment is 
specific to each scenario as discussed in previous section 
Approval of plan occurs 95% of the time and disapproval occurs 5% of the time and then 
requires re-approval with another delay added in 
Obtaining clearance to fire occurs 95% of the time and is delayed until clearance to fire is 
obtained the other 5% of the time 
Table 4.   Threat and Ship Assumptions Common to Both Scenarios 
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4. Scenario 1 Specific Assumptions 
In order to collect all the information needed to support the OATCTEPM, a 
number of assumptions are necessary for the mechanics of each scenario. Below these 
assumptions pertaining to scenario 1 are listed. 
 
Scenario 1 Assumptions 
The environmental conditions are ideal to support detection and engagement of the 
oncoming attack and the sea state is 0-1 
Eight two-man Type-I targets (personal watercraft), armed with 1 (each) Rocket-
Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and packed with high explosives which can be detonated by 
the driver, or remotely from a stand-off position by an observer, attack the High Value 
Unit (HVU) simultaneously from four different directions 
Keep-out range for the Type-I targets is 500 meters 
Inside 500 meters the targets can inflict a soft kill by damaging array faces, etc., with 
It is the intention of the Red Force to breech the hull with explosives and inflict a hard 
A total of four helicopter flight crews are embarked on USS VULNERABLE for the 
The ship has only two helicopters armed with 8 AGM-114 Hellfire missiles 
The helicopters are 100% operational ready and remain so throughout the given scenario 
All shipboard systems are fully operational and do not fail throughout the given scenario 
Table 5.   Scenario 1 Specific Assumptions 
Scenario 2 Specific Assumptions 
Table 6 lists the additional assumptions needed to implement scenario 2. 
Scenario 2 Assumptions 
The environmental conditions are ideal to support detection and engagement of the 
oncoming attack and the sea state is 0-1 
It is the intention of the red force to breech the hull with explosives or an anti-ship 
missile and inflict a hard kill (sink the ship) 
A total of four helicopter flight crews are embarked on USS VULNERABLE for the 
transit from the Mediterranean to the Battlegroup 
The ship has only two helicopters armed with 8 AGM-114 Hellfire missiles 
The helicopters are 100% operational ready and remain so throughout the given 
scenario 
All shipboard systems are fully operational and do not fail throughout the given 
scenario 
Table 6.   Scenario 2 Specific Assumptions 
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5. Overall Model Assumptions 
In addition to scenario assumptions and those related to the rules of engagement 
for the protagonist of this simulation, a number of assumptions were necessary to create 
the OATCTEPM itself. The below assumptions are necessary to fully understand the 
model and for interpreting results produced by the model. 
 
Weapon System Assumptions 
Initial engagement is directed to weapon based on initial weapon assignment 
Engagement can be routed to another weapon depending on round availability and target 
range 
Reaction time for each weapon system is accounted for 
Time of flight for each weapon system is accounted for 
Armed Helicopter positioning time is accounted for if applicable 














4 PAMS per VLS 
(2 VLS) 
2 each with 50 












0.85/salvo 0.95 0.90 0.95 
Amount of Total 




Capability no reload multiple 
2 reloads each 
of 50 bursts 
(delay 
required) 




Send to Other 
Weapon System 
GWS to 
CIWS PAM to GWS  
A delay is added in for loading gun rounds so the maximum firing rate for the gun is lower 
than the usual 15-20 rounds per minute 
Table 7.   Assumptions for Weapon Systems Used in the OATCTEPM 
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F. RADAR MODEL DESIGN 
The intent of the radar model is to simulate a modern surface search sensor. It 
provides the OATCEPM with associated ranges given the probability of detection ( DP ) 
and radar cross section (RCS) of the target. Furthermore, it plays a key role in the Search 
and Detect portion of the OATCTEPM by providing these ranges as inputs to the model 
as needed. The calculations and resulting detection tables can be found in Appendix III of 
this paper. 
 
G. OATCTEPM SIMULATION MODEL DESIGN 
The design of the OATCTEPM in the Arena software package was developed 
through the use of the functional flow block diagrams that were formulated from a 
combination of an initial analysis of the OAWSDM, the OODA loop, and research into 
time critical target requirements. A thorough analysis of the model was completed to 
ensure the OAWSDM is represented well throughout the OATCTEPM.  Each block 
contained within the model was analyzed and categorized into one of the eight functional 
blocks of the OAWSDM used in this simulation (the Learn function is not included).  The 
detailed design of the OATCTEPM is presented in Appendix II. 
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The main functions of the model are shown in figure 16 to help summarize the 
flow of the model: 
 
 
Figure 16.   Process Flow for the Main Functional Modules of the OATCTEPM 
The OATCTEPM was developed to evaluate the OAWSDM. The figure 
shows a top level view of the functional flow of the model. 
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H. LIMITATIONS 
In order to maintain the normal posture of a cruiser in the threat area, the 
OATCTEPM was not originally developed specific to an individual scenario.  For 
example, not all targets were meant to be hostile.  Furthermore, only a representative 
number of targets within the threat area were allocated to attack at varying times.  In 
order to properly test the model, groups of targets were created to arrive at different 
times.  However, this model is not currently designed to engage all created scenarios in a 
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V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Using the scenarios presented in Appendix I and the OATCTEPM was run. These 
results include a base case with values chosen to represent a baseline system. This was 
then changed to an idealized model in which full automation could be achieved, zeroing 
out all command and control function times. Finally, a number of incremental 
improvements on the baseline, ranging from five to thirty percent improvement on human 
decision times were studied. This section presents these results and is organized into five 
parts.  The first part outlines the measures of performance and effectiveness used to 
evaluate the model results. The second part provides the results for the base model. The 
third part provides the results from the idealized model which are used to establish the 
ideal values.  The output from the base model will be used to set the baseline from which 
areas of improvement can be determined.  The baseline also provides the thresholds that 
must be exceeded for a success to be declared.  The fourth part provides a comparison of 
the baseline and idealized models.  The final part provides results from the improved 
model and a comprehensive analysis of each improvement to the model with the 
interaction of the time based MOEs and the performance based MOEs.  The results and 
analysis are performed using data files generated by each model using Arena’s Output 
Analyzer. 
 
A. DISCUSSION OF MOPS AND MOES USED TO ANALYZE RESULTS 
Within each of the model results the data is separated by scenario 1 and 2 and is 
organized for comparison according to the MOPs and MOEs. The MOPs and MOEs 
utilized for the comparison of results are: 
 
Time-Based Measures of Performance: 
1. Validate Target Time 
2. Identify Target Time 
3. Threat Evaluation Time 
4. Target Priority Time 
5. Mission Evaluation Time 
6. Weapon Assignment Time 
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7. Plan Approval Time 
 
Measures of Effectiveness: 
8. Probability of Leaker  
9. Probability of Raid Annihilation 
10.  Probability of Success 
 
1. Discussion of Time-Based MOPs 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the seven different MOPs and the 
different variables that affect these MOPs.  This discussion will allow us to target the 
control times for improvement and will give a better understanding of the factors 
affecting the performance of the model. 
 
Validate Target Time 
This value represents the time span from firm track to target validation.  
Within that time period, target classification takes place.  Target classification will 
require human interaction and the use of different sensors to classify the target.  Electro-
optical and infrared sensors will be used to assist in this task.   
 
The first pass of target validation includes a classification of the target as 
friendly, unknown, or hostile.  If the track is classified as friendly, the track is 
disregarded for the purpose of the model.  An unknown target is sent through the 
classification process until it is classified as hostile or friendly.  The unknown target 
accumulates delays for each classification of unknown until it is classified as hostile or 
friendly.  If the target is classified as hostile, a final second pass delay is added.  The 
classification of a hostile target is assumed to be correct and is validated and a first pass 
delay is initiated, then the target is validated.   
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The most room for improvement is realized in the classification of the 
target as unknown.  If target classification could improve on the first pass, the overall 
target validation time could easily be improved by not accumulating more delays from 
the classification of an unknown target.  This may be a difficult area to improve due to 
the unknown or indeterminable intention of a suspect and the risk of committing a type-II 
error. 
 
Identify Target Time 
Identify target time is the time required from validation of the target to 
identifying the target.  Within this time period, the target is identified as a small target, 
medium target, or large target.  This target identification is based on the target’s radar 
cross section and is easily translated into small, medium, or large.  If an electro-optical or 
infrared sensor is used, human interaction occurs and results in a slightly longer delay for 
target identification. 
 
Identifying the target based on its radar cross section should not impose a 
very large delay in the overall process.  Room for improvement in target identification 
most likely does not exist and, if improved, will not improve the overall results by much 
due to the small amount of time needed to complete this task. 
 
Threat Evaluation Time 
Threat evaluation time is the time consumed between identifying target 
and threat evaluation of the target.  Threat evaluation is the process of evaluating the 
threat and recognizing the weapon range of the target.  The acquisition of the target’s 
weapon range provides us with the target’s keep out range.  The target’s keep out range 




Threat evaluation will use current intelligence and databases to assign a 
weapon range to that particular target according to its attributes.  Access to this 
information is automated and does not involve much human interaction.  The time needed 
to perform these tasks may be improved through improved threat evaluation techniques 
and may prove to be beneficial to the overall time needed to execute a target.   
 
Assign Target Priority Time 
Assign target priority time is the time required once threat evaluation is 
final to the completion of assigning the target a priority.  Assigning priority to a target is 
based on the target’s current range compared to the target’s keep out range as assessed in 
threat evaluation.  A target priority of 1, 2, or 3 is assigned to the target with 1 being the 
highest priority and 3 being the lowest priority. 
 
Assigning a target priority is an automatic task with the result determined 
by the current range of the target compared to the target’s determined keep out range.  
The task of assigning a target a priority does not involve much time at all and 
improvements would only lead to small improvements in overall performance.  Small 
improvements in multiple locations of the model could lead to a significant increase in 
performance. 
 
Mission Evaluation Time 
Mission evaluation time is the time needed to evaluate the mission as a go 
or no go and starts directly after the target is assigned a priority and ends after the 
mission evaluation is complete.  Mission evaluation involves some human interaction 
within and outside the platform along with automatic interaction within and outside the 
platform.  The mission may be evaluated as a no go and outside assistance is requested by 
the platform.  The two scenarios presented to the platform result in a mission go result for 
mission evaluation 95 percent of the time.  If the platform were saturated with more 
targets than presented in scenario 2, the platform would require outside assistance more 
than 5 percent of the time to successfully execute the raid of targets. 
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Mission evaluation could be rather quick depending on the situation.  The 
human interaction required within the platform and outside the platform lead to the belief 
that there could be room for improvement in the mission evaluation function of the 
model. 
 
Weapon Assignment Time 
Weapon assignment time is the time required to assign a weapon to a 
target and starts once mission evaluation is completed and only if the mission is evaluated 
as a mission go.  Weapon assignment time is complete once a weapon is assigned to a 
target.  The assignment of the weapon can change during the engagement portion of the 
model depending on availability and other factors.   
 
Four weapons are used for engagement in the two scenarios.  These four 
weapons are the Gun Weapons System (GWS), Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), 
Precision Attack Missile (PAM), and Armed Helicopter.  Since the platform is a CG-XX, 
the overall combat system includes a forward and aft Gun Mount, a forward and aft 
CIWS Mount, a forward and aft PAM launcher, and two armed helicopters armed with 
Hellfire missiles. 
 
The assignment of one of the four types of weapons depends on the target 
type and the target range.  The assignment of the weapon is an automatic function that 
uses logic to assign the weapon.  Human action is not required to complete this function; 
therefore, time to complete this function is not a problem. 
 
Plan Approval Time 
Plan approval time is the time required to review weapon assignments 
made by the platform and to acquire approval by the leader of the platform.  Plan 
approval time starts after the completion of weapon assignment and continues until the 
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plan to execute the target is approved.  If the plan is not approved for the target, another 
weapon assignment is made and the plan is reviewed.  After the plan is approved, which 
happens to be 95 percent of the time for these scenarios, clearance to fire must be 
obtained as a final check to fire the weapon at the target. 
 
Plan approval is the function that takes the most amount of time for the 
platform to execute.  Plan approval requires more human interaction than any of the other 
functions contained within the model.  For these reasons, plan approval should be a focus 
for improvement if at all possible. 
 
2. Discussion of MOEs 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the three different MOEs and the 
different variables that affect these MOEs.  This discussion will allow us to 
understanding of the factors affecting the performance of the model. 
 
Probability of Leaker 
Probability of Leaker is the average number of leakers observed within 
each trial.  The statistic is defined within the model by the following expression:  
 
Targets ofNumber 




Probability of Raid Annihilation 
Probability of Raid Annihilation is equal to one minus the Probability of 
Leaker.  The statistic is defined within the model by the following expression: 
 
Targets ofNumber 




Probability of Success 
Probability of Success is the actual number of trials run through the model 
that resulted in zero leakers being observed.  This MOE differs from Probability of Raid 
Annihilation since it is not based on the average output of each model taken over the 
entire run.  It is based on the actual quantity of leakers observed in each trial conducted.  
The statistic is defined within the model by the following expression: 
 
TrialsofNumber  Total




B. BASELINE MODEL 
 
The baseline model analyzes the time critical targeting engagement process for 
both scenario 1 and 2 given the generalized implementation of the OAWSDM discussed 
previously in this paper. It uses uniform distributions based on average time frames 
required to complete each C3 function.  Each of these delays allows the model to output 
baseline results for both the time-based MOPs and MOEs.   
 
 
 Baseline Times 
Model Results (500 reps) Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Probability of Leaker 9.8% 13% 
Probability of Raid Annihilation 90.2% 87% 
Probability of Success 48% 0.4% 
 
Table 8.   Baseline Results for MOEs 
 
Table 8 summarizes the average values displayed within the 95 percent 
confidence intervals for the MOEs illustrated in figures 17 and 18.  The probability of 
success for scenario 1 is 48 percent.  A total of two hundred sixty repetitions out of five 
hundred conducted allow a minimum of one leaker with the maximum observed of eight.  
The probability of leaker is 9.8 percent and the probability of raid annihilation is 90.2 
percent for any given trial in scenario 1.  Only two trials out of five hundred trials in 
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scenario 2 did not allow a leaker so the probability of success for scenario 2 is 0.4 
percent. The maximum number of leakers observed was twenty-one.  The probability of a 
leaker is 13 percent and the probability of raid annihilation is 87 percent for any given 













The Pareto charts showing the relative ranking of the time-based MOPs are 
displayed in figures 19 and 20.  The efforts to improve the model are focused on reducing 
the overall time consumed by the previously identified C3 functions.  Below, these 
functions are organized by their respective contribution to the C3 delay: 
1. Plan Approval 
2. Mission Evaluation 
3. Threat Evaluation 
4. Validate Target 
5. Target Priority 
6. Identify Target 
7. Weapon Assignment 
 
Plan Approval requires a minimum of three times more time to complete than any 
other of the C3 functions due to the extensive human interaction that occurs in this 
function.  In fact, all of the functions that take a longer amount of time to perform are the 
functions that include human action to complete.  These functions will be focused on in 
the improved model and decisions will be made in regards to which functions to improve.  
The results provide a starting point for both the idealized model and the improved model 










Figure 20.   Baseline Results of Time-Based MOPs in Scenario 2 
 
 
C. IDEALIZED MODEL 
The idealized model is a variation on the base model with all of the Command, 
Control and Communication (C3) times set to zero.  By setting all of the time-based 
MOPs to zero, idealized results are obtained.  These idealized results provide 
performance results of the OAWSDM if the C3 actions took no time to perform.  
Generating a set of idealized results identified a delta between it and the base model. 
 
 Idealized Times 
Model Results (500 reps) Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Probability of Leaker 4.7% 4.9% 
Probability of Raid Annihilation 95.3% 95.1% 
Probability of Success 64.2% 8.2% 
 
Table 9.   Idealized Results for MOEs 
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Table 9, above, summarizes the average values displayed within the 95 percent 
confidence intervals for the MOEs illustrated in figures 21 and 22.  The probability of 
success for scenario 1 is 64.2 percent.  A total of three hundred twenty-one repetitions out 
of five hundred conducted allow a minimum of one leaker with the maximum of five 
being observed.  The probability of leaker is 4.7 percent and the probability of raid 
annihilation is 95.3 percent for any given trial in scenario 1.  Only forty-one of the five 
hundred trials in scenario 2 did not allow a leaker so the probability of success for 
scenario 2 is 8.2 percent.  The maximum number of leakers observed was thirteen.  The 
probability of leaker is 4.9 percent and the probability of raid annihilation is 95.1 percent 
for any given trial in scenario 2.  The performance results for the idealized model 
establish the ideal standard for scenarios 1 and 2 without implementing changes to sensor 
or combat capability.  The results for the idealized model are significantly more than the 












Figure 22.   C.I. for Idealized Results of MOEs in Scenario 2. 
 
D. COMPARISON OF BASELINE AND IDEALIZED MODELS 
When comparing the MOEs and time-based MOPs for the idealized model and 
the base model, as shown in table 10, the baseline results indicate that room for 
improvement exists.   
 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Model Results (100 reps) Idealized Baseline Idealized Baseline 
Probability of Leaker 4.7% 9.8% 4.9% 13%
Probability of Raid Annihilation 95.3% 90.2% 95.1% 87%
Probability of Success 64.2% 48% 8.2% 0.4%
 
Table 10.   Comparison of Idealized and Baseline Results for Scenario 1 and 2 
 
 
Table 11 summarizes the MOPs for the idealized and base models.  Any MOP 
value resulting in an improvement from the baseline value, as shown in table 12, will be 






 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
MOEs for Improved Model Idealized Baseline Idealized Baseline 
Probability of Leaker 4.7% 9.8% 4.9% 13%
Probability of Raid Annihilation 95.3% 90.2% 95.1% 87%
Probability of Success 64.2% 48% 8.2% 0.4%
Validate Target Time 0 s 5.31 s 0 s 5.38 s
Identify Target Time 0 s 1.07 s 0 s 1.13 s
Threat Evaluation Time 0 s 6.87 s 0 s 6.56 s
Target Priority Time 0 s 2.08 s 0 s 2.01 s
Mission Evaluation Time 0 s 10.9 s 0 s 10.3 s
Weapon Assignment Time 0 s 0.79 s 0 s 0.79 s
Plan Approval Time 0 s 36.1 s 0 s 32.8 s
 
Table 11.   MOEs for the Idealized and Base Models 
 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
MOEs for Improved Model Success Success 
Probability of Leaker < 9.8% < 13% 
Probability of Raid Annihilation  > 90.2% > 87% 
Probability of Success > 48% > 0.4% 
Validate Target Time < 5.31 s < 5.38 s 
Identify Target Time < 1.07 s < 1.13 s 
Threat Evaluation Time < 6.87 s < 6.56 s 
Target Priority Time < 2.08 s < 2.01 s 
Mission Evaluation Time < 10.9 s < 10.3 s 
Weapon Assignment Time < 0.79 s < 0.79 s 
Plan Approval Time < 36.1 s < 32.8 s 
 
Table 12.   Range of Values Considered Improvements in MOEs 
 
E. ANALYSIS OF IMPROVED MODEL 
The focus of improvement for the OAWSDM is to decrease the time required to 
complete command, control, and communications functions with human involvement.  
Planning is the function in the OAWSDM that takes the most amount of time to complete 
due to the human decision making that must take place to approve the plan to execute 
targets.  Evaluating the mission and validating a target are the other functions that involve 
a large amount of human interaction.   
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The areas of decision aide tools and automation were investigated to determine 
what percentage of improvement could be realistically gained in the C3 functions that are 
heavily dependant on human interaction.  Appendix 4 contains the results of the testing of 
the various improved models.  The improved model was re-run six separate times with 
Plan Approval, Mission Evaluation and Threat Evaluation times being reduced 5 percent 
each pass up to a total of 30 percent reduction.  The detailed results of each pass can be 
found in Appendix 4.  Synopses of the results are displayed below. 
 
The time based MOPs, for scenario 1, are displayed in figure 23.  A steady 
reduction trend in C3 time can be observed from the base case (63.84 seconds) to the 30 
percent improvement case (46.86 seconds).  The MOEs, in figure 24, show a steady 
improvement trend in Probability of Raid Annihilation from the base case (89.5%) to the 
30 percent improvement case (94.3%).             
  
 





Figure 24.   Scenario 1 MOE Improvement 
 
The time based MOPs, for scenario 2, are displayed in figure 25.  A steady 
reduction trend in C3 time can be observed from the base case (59.25 seconds) to the 30 
percent improvement case (44.32 seconds).  The MOEs, in figure 26, show a steady 
improvement trend in Probability of Raid Annihilation from the base case (86.7%) to the 




Figure 25.   Scenario 2 C3 Time Based MOP Improvement 
 
 
Figure 26.   Scenario 2 MOE Improvement 
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F.  RESULTS OF IMPROVED MODEL 
Based on the analysis performed, the final version of the improved model was 
configured with a 30 percent reduction in the key human interaction portions of C3 time.  
This section details the results of the improved model when compared with the base and 
idealized model. 
 
From table 13, the probability of success for scenario 1 using improved command 
and control times is 62 percent.  One hundred ninety repetitions out of five hundred 
conducted allow a minimum of one leaker with the maximum observed of six.  The 
probability of leaker is 5.7 percent and the probability of raid annihilation is 94.3 percent 
for any given trial in scenario 1.  Only eight trials out of five hundred trials in scenario 2 
did not allow a leaker so the probability of success for scenario 2 is 1.6 percent. The 
maximum number of leakers observed was eighteen.  The probability of leaker is 8.6 
percent and the probability of raid annihilation is 91.4 percent for any given trial in 
scenario 2.  The performance results for the improved model are less than the idealized 
performance but illustrate improvement in comparison to the baseline model. 
 
 Improved Times 
Improved Model Results (500 reps) Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Probability of Leaker 5.7% 8.6% 
Probability of Raid Annihilation 94.3% 91.4% 
Probability of Success 62% 1.6% 
 
Table 13.   Summary of Improved Results for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 
 
The focus of improvement is to decrease the operator dependent times within the 
C3 portion of the model. A comparison of the results from the idealized, baseline and 
improved models for the primary and secondary MOEs is listed in table 14.  Applying the 
criteria for successful improvement from table 12, which simply specifies that each MOE 
for the Baseline system represent the threshold upon which the Improved system is 
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compared for each scenario, 1’s Identify Target Time, Threat Evaluation Time, Target 
Priority Time and Weapon Assignment Time did not meet or exceed the required 
thresholds. In scenario 2, Threat Evaluation Time and Target Priority Time did not meet 
or exceed the required thresholds for success. 
 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
MOEs for Improved Model Idealized Baseline Improved Idealized Baseline Improved
Probability of Leaker 4.7% 9.8% 5.7% 4.9% 13% 8.6%
Probability of Raid Annihilation 95.3% 90.2% 94.3% 95.1% 87% 91.4%
Probability of Success 64.2% 48% 62% 8.2% 0.4% 1.6%
Validate Target Time 0 s 5.31 s 3.72 s 0 s 5.38 s 3.65 s
Identify Target Time 0 s 1.07 s 1.09 s 0 s 1.13 s 1.08 s
Threat Evaluation Time 0 s 6.87 s 7.00 s 0 s 6.56 s 6.81 s
Target Priority Time 0 s 2.08 s 2.09 s 0 s 2.01 s 2.02 s
Mission Evaluation Time 0 s 10.9 s 7.55 s 0 s 10.3 s 7.2 s
Weapon Assignment Time 0 s 0.79 s 0.80 s 0 s 0.79 s 0.78 s
Plan Approval Time 0 s 36.1 s 24.7 s 0 s 32.8 s 22.5 s
 
Table 14.   Comparison of Improved Results to Idealized and Baseline Results 
 
Table 15 illustrates the effect on performance resulting from the uniform 
reduction of C3 times by 20% within the improved model. The average decrease in C3 
times, after 500 trials, for scenario 1 was 17.2 percent. The decrease in operator action 
delays resulted in a 41.9 percent reduction in Probability of Leakers which improves 
Probability of Raid Annihilation by 4.55 percent and Probability of Success by 29.17 
percent. A decrease of 14.9 percent was observed in C3 times for scenario 2. The decrease 
in operator action delays resulted in a 33.9 percent reduction in Probability of Leakers 
which improves Probability of Raid Annihilation by 5.1 percent and Probability of 









 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
MOEs for Improved Model Baseline Improved ∆Perf. Baseline Improved ∆Perf. 
Probability of Leaker 9.8% 5.7% 58.16% 13% 8.6% 66.15% 
Probability of Raid Annihilation 90.2% 94.3% 4.55% 87% 91.4% 5.06% 
Probability of Success 48% 62% 29.17% 0.4% 1.6% 300.00% 
Validate Target Time 5.31 s 3.72 s 70.06% 5.38 s 3.65 s 67.84% 
Identify Target Time 1.07 s 1.09 s -1.87% 1.13 s 1.08 s 95.58% 
Threat Evaluation Time 6.87 s 7.00 s -1.89% 6.56 s 6.81 s -3.81% 
Target Priority Time 2.08 s 2.09 s -0.48% 2.01 s 2.02 s -0.50% 
Mission Evaluation Time 10.9 s 7.55 s 69.27% 10.3 s 7.2 s 69.90% 
Weapon Assignment Time 0.79 s 0.80 s -1.27% 0.79 s 0.78 s 98.73% 
Plan Approval Time 36.1 s 24.7 s 68.42% 32.8 s 22.5 s 68.60% 
Total C3 Time 63.12 s 52.28 s 82.83% 58.97 s 50.17 s 85.08% 
Table 15.   Performance Changes from Baseline Model to Improved Model 
 
The performance increases for both scenarios are effectively the same. The large 
increase in Probability of Success for scenario 2 is the result of the limited number of 
trials that observed zero leakers.  The baseline and improved models produced a total of 
two and eight trials respectively where zero leakers were observed. In comparison, 
scenario 1 produced 240 and 310 trials respectively where zero leakers were observed.   
 
Table 16 illustrates the relationship between the number of leakers, the number of 
engaged targets in the system and C3 times.  The number of leakers within each scenario 
is the basis for calculating Probability of Leakers, Probability of Raid Annihilation and 














Scenario Model Leakers Engaged Targets C
3 Time
0 7.247 62.840 
1 8.503 63.103 
2 10.627 63.261 
Baseline 
3 11.839 64.523 
0 7.686 46.358 
1 9.639 47.805 
2 10.828 45.197 
1 
Improved
3 13.450 49.690 
0 44.000 58.850 
1 43.750 67.300 
2 49.000 57.600 
Baseline 
3 49.405 58.771 
0 47.625 45.838 
1 48.771 43.763 
2 49.156 44.222 
2 
Improved
3 50.543 44.612 
 
Table 16.   Number of Leakers to Engaged Targets and C3 Times 
 
For both scenarios the Probability of Raid Annihilation is decreased as the C3 
times are increased. The more time a target remains within the C3 portion of the model 
the fewer number of targets that can successfully be engaged without a leaker. Each 
target that enters the model has a finite time, based on individual kinematics, within 
which it can be engaged and destroyed or neutralized. Increases in the amount of time a 
target is required to pass through the C3 portion of the model reduces the time available to 
enter the engagement queue and be processed by the specific weapon. The smaller the 
engagement time the less likely the model will be able to re-engage a target that was not 
destroyed or neutralized. The baseline and improved models, for scenario 1, can only 
support a maximum of seven targets before the likelihood of a leaker will appear. For 
scenario 2, the baseline model can support a maximum of 44 targets and the improved 
model can support up to 47 targets before a leaker would likely appear.   
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. STUDY CONCLUSIONS 
After examining the OAWSDM in its current state to determine its capability to 
combat the surface TCT threat, with emphasis on the C3 portion of the open architecture, 
this study concludes the following. 
• Processes that required human interaction showed the longest delays and 
impacted the effectiveness of the OAWSDM against time critical targets. 
• Two key areas represented the longest delays: 
o Plan Approval Time, which averaged over 30 seconds in the baseline 
model, was the time required to review weapons assignments and acquire 
command approval to engage the TCT. 
o Mission Evaluation Time, which averaged over 10 seconds in the baseline 
model, was the time needed to evaluate the mission as a go or no go. 
•  Both delay times involved human-in-the-loop decision making. 
While the OAWSDM may not present any technical open architecture or network 
flaws in its design, it fails to factor in the role of humans into the decision making 
process.  In doing so, it overlooks a key factor in the effectiveness of the architecture 
against surface TCT engagements.  When processes requiring decision making were 
incrementally improved, the PRA correspondingly increased.  Therefore, future efforts to 
improve the effectiveness of combat system implementations based on the OAWSDM 
should focus on processes that decrease the amount of time required for human decision 
making. 
 
B. FUTURE WORK 
As the threat of surface TCT grows, the overall C3 function must adopt abilities to 
support larger and faster number of engagements.  As previously concluded, the common 
thread between these long delay times is some level of human involvement in the 
decision making process.  In order to achieve the reduced times described in this study’s 
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improved model, investing in technology such as automated decision aids and improving 
human systems integration are needed. 
 
The overarching process behind these changes has direct ties to the overall 
decision making capabilities of the involved parties. A recent study, Tactical Decision 
Making Under Stress, indicated a potential for improvement by implementing a Decision 
Support System (DSS). The DSS allowed Navy tactical decision making to be enhanced 
by integrating and organizing current pertinent situational information into a useable 
display. The study concluded, “Displays that are consistent with these naturalistic 
decision-making strategies provide the most useful support to commanders, facilitating 
the rapid development of an accurate assessment of the situation” (Hutchins, Kelly, 
Moore, Morrison 1997). Accordingly, a unique system that maintains a mode of 
situational awareness and has the ability to assist with specific decisions would help 
improve human-in-the-loop decision making.   
 
Therefore, incorporating automated decision aids into the command and control 
process is suggested for further research. The motivation behind this path is clearly 
defined by the fact that when engaging TCTs individuals are being inundated with mass 
amounts of information, which directly results in slower processing capabilities. In order 
to combat this inevitable problem, an autonomous system or automated decision support 
tool would allow the user a freedom to carefully make a decision and maintain a clear 









































APPENDIX I: SCENARIOS FOR TIME CRITICAL TARGETING 
(TCT) SIMULATION  
The two scenarios being presented are intended to serve as input for the Open 
Architecture Time Critical Targeting Engagement Process Model (OATCTEPM), 
constructed using Arena® software.  These scenarios provide representative attacks by 
potential adversaries and terrorist organizations in the regions where they are staged. The 
scenarios involve Fast In-shore Attack Craft (FIAC) designed to disable or destroy a US 




Political tensions between the United Nations (UN) and Iran have escalated and have led 
to a political stand-off over their uranium enrichment activities.  The Iranian government 
has long been suspected of harboring terrorists and financially supporting their activities.  
Recent intelligence reports have indicated Iran intends to supply terrorist organizations 
with weapons-grade materials and support for manufacturing of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD).  The Naval assets mentioned in these scenarios are not real and 
represent future capabilities. 
 
In response to the UN accusations, the Iranian Leadership has ordered the arrest of all 
remaining UN inspectors after setting an unrealistic deadline for their departure from the 
country.  The UN Security Council issued an ultimatum to release the inspectors or face 
potential aggressive action by UN forces.  In response to the UN ultimatum, the US and 
Allied forces have committed resources to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea as a show of 
force. In support of these efforts, the USS INVINCIBLE (CG(X)), currently located in 
the Mediterranean Sea, has been ordered to relieve other forces in the area. To reach the 
Joint Task Force (JTF), the USS INVINCIBLE will transit the Suez Canal, steam through 
the Red Sea, then transit the Mandeb Strait (also know as Bab el Mandeb) into the Gulf 





Figure 27.   Map of Mandeb Straight and Gulf of Aden 
The Mandeb Straight connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.  The area 
of the attack in the first scenario is indicated by the red explosion. 
(Wikipedia Contributors, Yemen) 
 
A second ship, the USS DEFENDER (CG-X) is on a Northerly heading from the Indian 
Ocean toward the Gulf of Oman, where it will transit the Straight of Hormuz, and enter 




Figure 28.   Map of the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf 
The Straight of Hormuz connects the Arabian Sea to the Persian Gulf.  
The area of the attack in the second scenario is indicated by the red 
explosion. (Straight of Hormuz map from: Global Security 
Organization.hormuz_80.gif 2005) 
 
Intelligence reports have been provided to the fleet operating in this region.  Specific 








Two-man personal watercraft 
with Rocket Propelled Grenade 
(RPG) weapons and/or a large 
blast bomb used in a suicide 
attack.  Credited with a firing 
range of 500 meters, at which 
point the enemy is assessed as a 
“leaker”, who has achieved their 
mission objectives by inflicting 
damage on the target vessel.  
(Galligan, Galdorisi and 
Marland 2005) 
  




This Air Force photo from the Defense Visual Information Center 
(Hannan 2002) depicts Coast Guard personnel acting as terrorists armed 
with RPG in exercise Northern Exposure 2002. 
 
Avg. Speed:  40 knots 
Armament:  Rocket Propelled Grenade  (RPG) Launcher 
Effective Range: 500 Meters    
Estimated RCS: 3 dBm 2  
 
Additional Info: This threat can be deployed from other sea-borne 











Medium sized “Boghammar” 
class boat with an unguided 
multiple launch bombardment 
rocket, or a larger anti-tank 
guided weapon with a launch 
range of 9 km, at which point it 
then becomes a “leaker”. 
(Galligan, Galdorisi and 
Marland 2005) 
 
Iranian Boghammar Craft 
 
 
This is 1992 and it is an Iranian Boghammar brought back to Coronado 
after being sunk during Operation Earnest Will. Special Boat Unit-13 had 
two and they were used as “aggressor boats” against the fleet in exercises. 
(Boghammar Photo: http://www.warboats.org/SBU13.htm) 
 
Speed:   40 knots 
Armament:  107mm Rocket Launcher 
Effective Range: 9 km 
Estimated RCS: 6 dBm 2  
 
Additional Info: “Iranian manufactured rockets launchers include 
the Haseb, an Iranian 12 tube 107 mm MRL that is a variant of a Chinese 









Small Fast Patrol Boat (FPB) 
typified by C-14 Cat-class 
Catamaran Missile Boat, with 
smaller anti-ship missile and 
degree of sensor and Command 
and Control (C2) fit.  Weapon 
ranges of out to 15 km for the 
ASM exist.  Once the boat 
crosses the 15 km point, it will 
become a “leaker”. 
 
 
C-14 Cat-class Catamaran Missile Boat 
 
C-14 Photo: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/ 
pcfg-cat-pics.htm 
Speed:   50 knots 
Armament:  C-701 Anti Ship Missile 
Effective Range: 15 km (~8 miles) 
Estimated RCS: 10 dBm 2  
Additional Info: “The C-701 light-weight anti-ship missile measures 
2.5 meters long, less than half that of the Yingji-801. The diameter of the 
subsonic anti-ship short-range missile is also much smaller. It has a range 
of 15 kilometers and a cruising speed of Mach 0.8. It uses television 
guidance control and is anti-jamming capability is comparable to that of 
the US Maverick missile. However, the C-701 can be launched from ships 
and planes, unlike the air-to-surface Maverick. “ (Globalsecurity.org 
2007) 
“The C-701 anti-ship missile was first exhibited at China's Second 
International Aviation and Aerospace Show held in Zhuhai late 1998. 
Initially only a version launched from a helicopter was revealed. But at 
the end of 1998, China announced that a version launched from a building 
was under development. It would be in service in 2002.”  (Globalsecurity 
2007) 
 
Table 17.   Summary of Threats 
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Note:  All estimated RCS values were derived from information contained in 
“Table 10.4 Generalized Maritime RCS values – Radar Technology 
Encyclopedia” of John Briggs’ book Target Detection by Marine Radar. 
 
 
SCENARIO #1 - ATTACK BY A GROUP OF TYPE-1 FAST INSHORE ATTACK 
CRAFT (FIAC) 
 
Type-I (2-man personal watercraft) FIAC will be the only attacking craft for this 
scenario. 
 
Tactical Situation (TACSIT) 
The USS INVINCIBLE (CG-X) has transitioned the narrowest portion of the Mandeb 
Straight and is making 15 knots on a Southerly heading.  The USS INVINCIBLE 
represents the most sophisticated vessel in the US Navy's inventory. Consequently, it is 
considered a high priority target and would demoralize the Blue forces with a defeat. The 
Mandeb Straight represents one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.   
 
Assumptions 
• The environmental conditions are ideal to support detection and engagement of 
the oncoming attack and the sea state is calm. 
• Approximately eight 2-man Type-1 (personal watercraft), armed with 1 (each) 
Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and packed with high explosives which can 
be detonated by the driver, or remotely from a stand-off position by an observer, 
will attack the High Value Unit (HVU) simultaneously from various directions. 
• Keep-out range for the Type-1 targets is 500 meters.  Inside 500 meters the targets 
can inflict mission kill by damaging array faces, etc., with shrapnel (Galligan, 
Galdorisi and Marland 2005). 
• It is the intention of the red force to breech the hull with explosives and inflict a 
hard kill (sink the ship). 
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• Intelligence has established a high threat level based on previous FIAC attacks in 
this area; however, if the FIAC breech the 500 meter keep-out range, a mission 
kill is assured. 
• A total of two helicopters and four flight crews are embarked on USS 
INVINCIBLE for this scenario. 
• Both helicopters are armed with Hellfire missiles.  It is also assumed that the 
helicopters are 100% operational ready and will remain so throughout the given 
scenario. 
• All shipboard systems will be fully operational and will not fail throughout the 
given scenario. 
 
Blue Force Posture 
The Fleet Commander has ordered all Naval vessels underway in this area to maintain the 
appropriate alert level for independent steaming. Currently, USS INVINCIBLE is 
steaming independently in a high-traffic area, with two armed airborne helicopters 
providing support around own ship. 
 
Red Force Posture 
The red force consists of a cell of terrorists, who have planned to execute an attack on a 
U.S. HVU on very short notice.  Red Force intelligence has reported the USS 
INVINCIBLE transitioning the Red Sea, headed south.  The red cell has outfitted eight 
personal watercraft with High Explosives (HE) and two suicide terrorists each.  The 
second terrorist on each personal watercraft is armed with an RPG-7 launcher.  Four 
civilian vessels have been employed to piggy-back the personal watercraft in pairs to 
strategic locations to execute and ambush-type attack.  When the attack commences, all 
eight targets will be inbound simultaneously at a range of 3 km and an average speed of 
40 knots. 
 
The Red Cell has decided to attack the USS INVINCIBLE after she transitions the 




The red cell has deployed one of the fishing vessels (Piggyback-1) in the Red Sea.  This 
vessel is the cell coordinator and has spotted the USS INVINCIBLE.  (Note: A-xx is 
denoting “Attack, minus xx time.”)  Figure 29 below can be referenced for a description 
of the attack. 
 
A-12 hours:  Piggyback-1 follows INVINCIBLE at a safe distance South, through the 
Mandeb Straight.  USS INVINCIBLE has two helicopters airborne, enforcing the 1000 
meter keep-out range. 
 
A-6 hours:  Piggyback #1 updates the red forces of USS INVINCIBLE’s location and 
issues the order for Piggyback 2 through 4 to assume their pre-determined positions.  The 




Figure 29.   Red Cell Attack Plan  
This figure shows the approximate position of all forces involved in 
scenario 1. The engagement takes place in the Bab el Mandeb with eight 
hostile personal watercrafts positioned around the cruiser. 
 
 
A-2 hours:  All red cell forces are in attack positions and holding (with the exception of 
Piggyback-1 who is following at matched speed of 20 knots, range 3 km). 
 
A-30 minutes: Piggyback-1 increases speed closes on USS INVINCIBLE.  The Tactical 
Action Officer (TAO) is alerted to the fishing vessel which is closing in on the ship and 
will breech the 1,000 meter keep-out zone in approximately 3 minutes 15 seconds. 
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A-0 minutes: USS INVINCIBLE reaches the trip-point and all four Piggyback platforms 
deploy personal watercraft, which immediately head directly toward own ship, averaging 
40 knots.  The position, range and other kinematical information of each target is 





Relative Bearing to 
Own Ship 
Average Speed 
1 3,000 Meters 45.0 Degrees 40 Knots 
2 3,000 Meters 45.0 Degrees 40 Knots 
3 3,000 Meters 135.0 Degrees 40 Knots 
4 3,000 Meters 135.0 Degrees 40 Knots 
5 3,000 Meters 225.0 Degrees 40 Knots 
6 3,000 Meters 225.0 Degrees 40 Knots 
7 3,000 Meters 315.0 Degrees 40 Knots 
8 3,000 Meters 315.0 Degrees 40 Knots 
 
Table 18.   Scenario 1 Target Information 
 
 
SCENARIO #2 - FIAC SATURATION ATTACK 
 
TACSIT: 
USS DEFENDER is steaming toward the Persian Gulf.  Intelligence reports that a 
terrorist cell, which is believed to be supported by the Iranian government, planned and 
executed an attack on USS INVINCIBLE earlier the same day.  All ships in the area are 
alerted and additional ISR assets are tasked to support areas of potential attack within and 





Figure 30.   Map of the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf Area 
The relative arrangement of forces for scenario 2 is shown in this figure. 
The engagement takes place in the Persian Gulf near the Straight of 
Hormuz. (Straight of Hormuz map from: Global Security 
Organization.hormuz_80.gif, 2005) 
 
The Persian Gulf is a busy body of water that routinely contains shipping and fishing 
vessels, as well as small recreational craft.  While Iran borders the Persian Gulf, there are 
also several neutral and non-hostile countries that do as well.  In light of the earlier attack 
on the USS INVINCIBLE, coalition forces have issued multiple warnings to local 
countries and broadcast routine messages warning vessels to avoid approaching Coalition 
Naval vessels, or they will be fired upon. To prevent firing on non-hostile boats, requests 
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have been made to all local friendly and neutral countries to warn their population to 




• The environmental conditions are ideal to support detection and engagement of 
the oncoming attack and the sea state is calm. 
• Current rules of engagement for the coalition forces are to monitor local traffic 50 
km radius and look for any patterns of behavior that may indicate organization or 
potential attack including but not limited to trailing, running parallel courses, 
slowly approaching the vessel, loitering.   
• Coalition forces are also monitoring radio and local communications chatter 
including cell phone and satellite phone communication. 
• It is the intention of the red force to breech the hull with explosives or an anti-ship 
missile and inflict a hard kill (sink the ship). 
• Intelligence has established a high threat level based on previous FIAC attacks in 
this area; however, if the FIAC breech their respective keep-out range, a soft kill 
is assured. 
• A total of two helicopters and two flight crews are embarked on USS 
DEFENDER for this scenario. 
• Both helicopters are armed with Hellfire missiles.  It is also assumed that the 
helicopters are 100% operational ready and will remain so throughout the given 
scenario.  
• All shipboard systems will be fully operational and will not fail throughout the 
given scenario.   
 
The USS DEFENDER is at a high state of alert and is connected to a joint tactical 
cooperative engagement network, which includes sensor data from other ships as well as 




Red Force Posture: 
After the attack on the USS INVINCIBLE in the Mandeb Strait, enemy forces have 
decided to mount a second, coordinated attack using about 50 small boats of various 
types.  The incoming boats will consist of approximately 20 Type I, 20 Type II, and 10 
Type III FIAC.  The red force intends to attack from multiple bearings.  The attack will 
occur around mid day.  
 
The Attack 
A-4 Minutes:  Intelligence notes increased chatter among boat traffic surrounding 
coalition forces.  Intelligence also intercepts a short satellite phone message with the 
words “commence” and “attack” in the message.   
 
A-3 Minutes:  Red forces begin their approach from multiple bearings. 
 
A-0 Minutes:  USS DEFENDER goes to general quarters and immediately begins 
focusing on non-cargo suspect targets.  Remaining helicopter is launched, for a total of 
two helicopters armed with Hellfire missiles, which are patrolling around the ship. 





















1-5 (Type-III) 50 Kilometers 90.0 Degrees 50 Knots 
6-10 (Type-III) 50 Kilometers 270.0 Degrees 50 Knots 
11-15 (Type-II) 45 Kilometers 45.0 Degrees 40 Knots 
16-20 (Type-II) 45 Kilometers 135.0 Degrees 40 Knots 
21-25 (Type-II) 45 Kilometers 225.0 Degrees 40 Knots 
26-30 (Type-II) 45 Kilometers 315.0 Degrees 40 Knots 
31-35 (Type-I) 3000 Meters 0.0 Degrees 40 Knots 
36-40 (Type-I) 3000 Meters 90.0 Degrees 40 Knots 
41-45 (Type-I) 3000 Meters 180.0 Degrees 40 Knots 
46-50 (Type-I) 3000 Meters 270.0 Degrees 40 Knots 
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APPENDIX II: DETAILED DISCUSSION OF OATCTEPM DESIGN 
Detailed model parameters are shown in table 20 through table 25 below the detailed 
discussion of the model.  Please refer to that table for model parameters.  The detailed 
discussion of each model block follows below. 
 
 
1.0 SEARCH/DETECT (S/D) 
 
The S/D functions of the OATCTEPM are further broken down into Sensor Asset, Sensor 
Report, Sensor Track Report, INTEL Report, and Measurement Report.  The model 
blocks created in ARENA that represent the S/D block of the OATCTEPM are shown 
below with a description: 
 
Search:  Creates the target and provides a delay for the search of the target. 
Assumptions 
1. This block does not affect MOEs because the time will not be measured until 
target is detected. 
2. Parameters for this block will vary depending on scenario.  A variable has been 
created in ARENA that allows the user to enter the total number of targets that 
change based on scenario number. 
3. For scenario 1, the total number of targets is 65.  Out of the 65 targets entered, on 
average, 8 small targets will be considered hostile. 
4. For scenario 2, the total number of targets is 400.  On average, 20 small targets 
will be considered hostile, 20 medium targets will be considered hostile, and 10 
large targets will be considered hostile.  Out of the 400 targets, 50 will be 
considered hostile and scheduled for engagement. 
 
Detect:  Assigns target range and detection time. 
Assumptions: 
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1. For scenario 1, the Detect_Range assignment will be “3”. 
2. For scenario 2, the Detect_Range assignment will be “discrete 
(0.4,3,0.8,45,1,50)”. 
 
Locate:  Decision block that divides the targets into large RCS, medium RCS, and small 
RCS based on the detection range of the target. 
 
Large RCS:  Assigns target type large RCS, assigns target profile of either incoming or 
outbound, and assigns a speed to the target. 
Assumptions: 
1. Speed of large target will be 0.02572 kilometers per second or approximately 50 
knots. 
 
Medium RCS:  Assigns target type medium RCS, assigns target profile of either 
incoming or outbound, and assigns a speed to the target. 
Assumptions: 
1. Speed of medium target will be 0.02058 kilometers per second or approximately 
40 knots. 
 
Small RCS:  Assigns target type small RCS, assigns target profile of either incoming or 
outbound, and assigns a speed to the target. 
Assumptions: 




2.0  DATA/INFORMATION SERVICES (DIS) 
 
The DIS functions of the OATCTEPM are broken down into the following functions:  
System Track, Supporting Source Track, Classification, Track Kinematics, Attribute 
Data, Track Repository, NRT Intel Track, and Sensor Scheduler.  The model blocks 
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created in ARENA that represent DIS functions are shown below with a description of 
the block and its function: 
 
Transition to Track:  Decision block that leads to dropped track if target is outbound. 
 
Disregard Track if Outbound:  Disregard track if target is outbound. 
Assumptions: 
1. Assume that all tracks that are outbound will remain outbound and all tracks that 
are inbound will remain inbound. 
 
Firm Track?:  Decision block that leads to firm track if target is within range and delay if 
target is not within range. 
Assumptions: 
1. Assume that there will be no delay for firm track for all small targets.  All small 
targets are well within range for tracking purposes and will immediately be 
transitioned to firm track. 
 
Awaiting Firm Track:  Decision block that leads to delay based on target RCS. 
 
Large RCS Delay:  Provides delay until firm track has been established for large RCS 
targets. 
 
Medium RCS Delay:  Provides delay until firm track has been established for Medium 
RCS targets. 
 
Firm Track Time:  Assigns firm track time and firm track range. 
 
Classify Target:  Decision block that leads to classification of the target as hostile, 
unknown, or friendly for first pass classification. 
Assumptions: 
1. Fifteen percent of targets are considered hostile in the operating area. 
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2. Twenty percent of targets are considered unknown in the operating area. 
3. The final sixty-five percent of targets in the operating area are considered 
friendly. 
4. These numbers were estimated from people who have been deployed in the 
operating area. 
 
Hostile First Pass:  Assigns the target as hostile. 
 
Unknown First Pass:  Assigns the target as unknown. 
 
Friendly First Pass:  Assigns the target as friendly. 
 
Disregard Track First Pass:  If target is assigned friendly, track is disregarded. 
 
Reclassify Target:  Decision block that reclassifies unknown targets as hostile, unknown, 
or friendly. 
 
Hostile Second Pass:  Assigns the previously unknown target as hostile. 
 
Friendly Second Pass:  Assigns the previously unknown target as friendly. 
 
Disregard Track Second Pass:  If target is assigned friendly, track is disregarded. 
 
Validate Target:  Validates classification of target. 
 
 
3.0 PLANNING, ASSESSMENT, AND DECISION (PAD) 
 
The PAD functions of the OATCTEPM are broken down into the following functions:  
Assigned Missions, Tactical Picture, Action Plans, Capability, Plan, Threat Assessment 
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(including Identity) and C2 Order, Schedule, and Event.  The model blocks created in 
ARENA that represent PAD functions are shown below with a description of the block: 
 
Identify Target:  Decision block that identifies each target as small, medium, or large. 
 
Type 1 Target Small:  Assigns target type 1 small to target.   
 
Type 2 Target Medium:  Assigns target type 2 medium to target. 
 
Type 3 Target Large:  Assigns target type 3 large to target. 
 
Threat Evaluation:  Decision block that sends target to assign block depending on target 
type. 
 
Target Type 1 Weapon Range:  Assigns target weapon range of 500 meters to all small 
targets. 
 
Target Type 2 Weapon Range:  Assigns target weapon range of 9 kilometers to all 
medium targets. 
 
Target Type 3 Weapon Range:  Assigns target weapon range of 15 kilometers to all large 
targets. 
 
Assign Target Priority:  Assigns a priority to each target depending on keepout range and 
current range of target. 
Assumptions: 
1. All targets within 4 kilometers of their keepout range will be assigned a priority of  
2. All targets within 8 kilometers but greater than 4 kilometers will be assigned a 
priority of 2. 
3. Any targets at a range greater than 8 kilometers will be assigned a priority of 3. 
4. Target priorities range from 1 to 3. 
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5. Target priorities can change as they make their way through the control and 
engagement portions of the model. 
 
Assign Priority 1 for Target Type 1:  Assigns a priority of 1 to small targets. 
 
Assign Priority 2 for Target Type 1:  Assigns a priority of 2 to small targets. 
 
Assign Priority 3 for Target Type 1:  Assigns a priority of 3 to small targets. 
 
Assign Priority 1 for Target Type 2:  Assigns a priority of 1 to medium targets. 
 
Assign Priority 2 for Target Type 2:  Assigns a priority of 2 to medium targets. 
 
Assign Priority 1 for Target Type 3:  Assigns a priority of 1 to large targets. 
 
Assign Priority 2 for Target Type 3:  Assigns a priority of 2 to large targets. 
 
Mission Evaluation:  Decision block that evaluates the mission as “go” or “no go.”  If 
mission is evaluated as “go”, the target continues through the model.  If mission is 
evaluated as “no go”, the mission is sent to another platform for engagement or other 
options.  
Assumptions: 
1. Ninety-five percent of all missions are assigned “go” for the scenarios presented. 
2. A cruiser should be able to approve at least ninety-five percent of the missions 
presented to it if the missions meet the scenario (scenario 1 or 2) guidelines 
presented to this model. 
 
Send to other:  Target is sent to another platform for engagement or other options. 
 
Mission Go:  Mission is evaluated as “go” and assigned “go” for continuation. 
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Weapon Assignment:  Decision block that assigns a weapon according to target type and 
target range. 
Assumptions: 
1. Weapons are assigned according to specific scenario.  Certain weapons are chosen 
for scenario 1 based on parameters presented in scenario 1 and certain weapons 
are chosen for scenario 2 based on parameters presented in scenario 2. 
2. CIWS and GWS are assigned to targets in scenario 1. 
3. CIWS, GWS, PAM, and Armed Helo are assigned targets in scenario 2. 
4. Small arms have not been assigned in this model.  If a ship was being 
overwhelmed by small boats, small arms would most likely be utilized and would 
give the ship a slightly better chance of defending itself.   
5. Since the keepout range for small targets was assigned as 500 meters, small arms 
were not implemented into the model. 
 
Assign GWS:  Assigns GWS as engaging weapon for target. 
 
Assign CIWS:  Assigns CIWS as engaging weapon for target. 
 
Assign PAM:  Assigns PAM as engaging weapon for target. 
 
Assign Armed Helo:  Assigns Armed Helo as engaging weapon for target. 
 
Target Within Keepout Range:  Ends target movement through model due to target 
reaching its keepout range.  When a target reaches this point, a failure is recorded. 
 
Range Update for Engagement:  Calculates target range for engagement and evaluation. 
 
Assign Higher Priority?:  Decision block that assigns a higher priority for immediate 
execution of target if it is within 1 kilometer of its keepout range. 
Assumptions: 
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1. Targets approaching their own keepout range are assigned a higher priority, but 
maintain a lower priority than targets that are reengaged by the system.  
 
Assign High Priority:  Actual assignment of a higher priority occurs in this block.  A 
higher priority target will move ahead in the engagement queue to the front of the queue 
for immediate engagement. 
 
 
4.0 WEAPON / ASSET SERVICES (W/AS) 
 
The W/AS functions of the OATCTEPM are broken down into the following functions:  
Action:  Weapon, RV, NAV, and Engineering, Schedule:  Weapon, RV, NAV, and 
Engineering, Event:  Weapon, RV, NAV, and Engineering.  The model blocks created in 
ARENA that represent W/AS services are shown below with a description of the block: 
 
Assumptions: 
1. GWS rounds will always be available because the scenarios being executed 
will never use the maximum number of GWS rounds available on the ship.   
2. CIWS rounds will always be available because the scenarios being executed 
will never use the maximum number of GWS rounds available on the ship. 
3. There are a maximum number of rounds (24 missiles) available for PAM. 
4. There are a maximum number of rounds (16 Hellfire missiles, 8 each Armed 
Helo) available for Armed Helo.  
 
Direct Engagement to Weapon:  Decision block that sends target to a particular 
engagement queue based on assignments made to target in previous sections of the 
model. 
 
PAM Available?:  Decision block that checks to see if the PAM system is available for 
target engagement.  If the system is available, the target is sent to the engagement queue 
for PAM.  If it is not available, the target is sent to GWS for engagement. 
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Armed Helo Rounds Available?:  Decision block that checks to see if Hellfire Missiles 
are available for target engagement.  If Hellfire are available, the target is sent to the 
engagement queue for Armed Helo.  If Hellfire are not available, the target is sent to 
PAM for engagement. 
 
 
5.0 MISSION EXECUTION (ME) 
 
The ME functions of the OATCTEPM are broken down into the following functions:  
Air/Surface Missile, Land Attack Missile, Torpedo, Gun, Decoy, Aircraft, Boat, Un-
Manned Vehicle, Engineering, Damage, and Bridge.  The model blocks created in 
ARENA that represent ME services are shown below with a description of the block: 
 
Assumptions: 
1. Reaction, flight, cycle, and kill evaluation times have been estimated, but errors in 
these estimates may exist. 
2. Probability of kill numbers have been estimated for each of the weapon systems 
and the accuracy of these numbers is unknown. 
3. Re-engagement of a target happens immediately after the first engagement and a 
target moves ahead in the queue for re-engagement. 
 
GWS Reaction Time:  Reaction time for GWS engagement. 
 
GWS Cycle:  GWS engagement queue for targets. 
Assumptions: 
1. The firing doctrine for GWS is shoot three-look-shoot three. 
 
GWS Time of Flight:  GWS time of flight based on target range. 
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GWS Kill Evaluation Delay:  Time needed for GWS kill evaluation.  The Optical 
Sighting System (OSS is an EO/IR system) is used for kill evaluation in the GWS. 
 
GWS Range Update for Kill Evaluation:  Updates target range for kill evaluation 
decision block. 
 
GWS Range Evaluation:  Decision block that checks target range and makes sure target is 
not within keepout range before target kill. 
 
Target within Keepout Range GWS:  Records targets that have reached their respective 
keepout range. 
 
GWS Kill Evaluation:  Decision block that decides whether a target engaged by GWS has 
been killed.  If target was not killed, a higher priority is assigned to the target so the target 
moves to the front of the engagement queue for re-engagement.   
Assumptions: 
1. Re-engaging a target that was not killed with previous rounds saves time.  This is 
why a higher priority has been assigned for re-engagement. 
 
GWS Kill:  Ends model and records target as a kill. 
 
Assign Higher Priority for GWS ReEngage:  A higher priority is assigned to engage the 
target immediately. 
 
GWS Range Evaluation for ReEngage:  Evaluates range of target to make sure target is 
not within keepout range before re-engagement. 
 
Target Within Keepout Range for ReEngage GWS:  Target has reached its respective 
keepout range before re-engagement occurred. 
 
CIWS Reaction Time:  Reaction time for CIWS engagement. 
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CIWS Cycle:  CIWS engagement queue for targets. 
Assumptions: 
1. Firing doctrine for CIWS is shoot burst-look-shoot burst. 
 
CIWS Time of Flight:  CIWS time of flight based on target range. 
 
CIWS Kill Evaluation Delay:  Time needed for CIWS kill evaluation.  
 
CIWS Range Evaluation:  Decision block that checks target range and makes sure target 
is not within keepout range before target kill. 
 
Target within Keepout Range CIWS:  Records targets that have reached their respective 
keepout range. 
 
CIWS Kill Evaluation:  Decision block that decides whether a target engaged by CIWS 
has been killed.  If target was not killed, a higher priority is assigned to the target so the 
target moves to the front of the engagement queue for re-engagement.  
 
CIWS Kill:  Ends model and records target as a kill. 
 
Assign Higher Priority for CIWS ReEngage:  A higher priority is assigned to engage the 
target immediately. 
 
Target Within Keepout Range for ReEngage CIWS:  Target has reached its respective 
keepout range before re-engagement occurred. 
 
CIWS Range Evaluation for ReEngage:  Evaluates range of target to make sure target is 
not within keepout range before re-engagement. 
 
PAM Reaction Time:  Reaction time for PAM engagement. 
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PAM Cycle:  Engagement queue for PAM weapon. 
Assumptions: 
1. Firing doctrine for PAM is shoot one-look-shoot one. 
 
PAM Time of Flight:  Time of flight for PAM based on target range. 
 
PAM Kill Evaluation Delay:  Delay for kill evaluation by PAM weapon system. 
 
PAM Range Evaluation:  Update to target range for range evaluation of target. 
 
Target within Keepout Range PAM:  Target has reached its respective keepout range. 
 
PAM Kill Evaluation:  Kill evaluation delay for PAM. 
 
PAM Kill:  Target kill recorded for PAM and end of model for target. 
 
Assign Higher Priority for PAM ReEngage:  A higher priority is assigned to target for 
immediate re-engagement of target by PAM. 
 
PAM Range Evaluation for ReEngage:  Evaluates target range before re-engagement to 
check to see if target has reached its respective keepout range. 
 
Target within Keepout Range for ReEngage PAM:  Records number of targets that have 
reached their keepout range. 
 
Delay for GWS Range:  If target is sent to GWS from PAM weapon system, a delay is 
executed until target reaches GWS max range for engagement. 
 
Armed Helo Reaction Time:  Reaction time for Armed Helo engagement. 
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Armed Helo RePosition:  Reposition time for Armed Helo to reach target. 
Assumptions: 
1. Armed Helo Reposition time is based on the speed of the helicopter and the range 
to the targets. 
 
Armed Helo Cycle:  Engagement queue for Armed Helo. 
Assumptions: 
1. Firing doctrine for Armed Helo is shoot one-look-shoot one. 
 
Armed Helo Time of Flight:  Time of flight for hellfire missile. 
 
Armed Helo Kill Evaluation Delay:  Delay for kill evaluation through Armed Helo pilots. 
 
Armed Helo Range Evaluation:  Evaluates target range. 
 
Target within Keepout Range Armed Helo:  Checks to see if target has reached its 
respective keepout range. 
 
Armed Helo Kill Evaluation:  Decision block that decides if target has been killed by 
Hellfire missile. 
 
Armed Helo Kill:  Records target kill by Armed Helo and ends model for target. 
 
Assign Higher Priority for Armed Helo ReEngage:  A higher priority is assigned to target 
for immediate re-engagement. 
 






6.0 EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS (EXCOMM) 
 
The EXCOMM functions of the OATCTEPM are broken down into the following 
functions:  Communications Service Action, Network Schedule, Message Event, 
Network, Data Links, Radios, and SatCom.  The model blocks created in ARENA that 
represent EXCOMM services are shown below with a description of the block: 
 
Assumptions: 
1. All delay times are estimates. 
 
Search Delay:  Delay for search of target. 
 
Detection Delay:  Delay for target detection. 
 
Locate Delay:  Delay for locate of target. 
 
Firm Track Delay:  Delay for establishing firm track of target. 
 
First Pass Delay:  First pass delay for target classification. 
 
Second Pass Delay:  Second pass delay for target classification. 
 
Re Classify Delay for Unknown:  A delay is executed if classification of target continues 
to be unknown. 
 
Identify Delay:  Delay for finalizing target identity. 
 
Threat Evaluation Delay:  Delay for threat evaluation. 
 
Target Priority Delay:  Delay for assigning target priorities. 
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Mission Evaluation Delay:  Delay for evaluation of mission. 
 
Weapon Assign Delay:  Delay for weapon assignment. 
 
Plan Approval Delay:  Delay for approval of plan for execution of targets. 
 
Delay for Waiting:  Delay for waiting for approval of plan. 
 
Clearance to Fire Delay:  Delay for waiting for clearance to fire to be obtained. 
 
Update Priority Delay:  Delay for updating the priority of a target to higher priority based 
on target range. 
 
 
7.0 COMMON SERVICES (CS) 
 
The CS functions of the OATCTEPM are broken down into the following functions:  
Display, Time, NAV, DX/DR, Databases, and Environment.  The model blocks created 




1. A failure by a weapon system does not mean that the failure is caused by the 
weapon system.  The failure could have been contributed to the target not being 
detected far enough in range to allow the weapon system to engage the target in 
time or there may be other circumstances that contributed to a failure by the 
cruiser. 
 
Locate Range Update:  Update to target range at time of target locate function of model. 
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Range Update for Priority:  Update to target range at time of target priority function of 
model. 
 
Range Update for Plan:  Update to target range for planning purposes of the model. 
 
Range Update for Engagement:  Update to target range for engagement of the target.  A 
higher priority is assigned to target if this range update shows that the target is within 1 
kilometer of its respective keepout range. 
 
GWS Range Update for Kill Evaluation:  Target range is updated for kill evaluation. 
 
CIWS Range Update for Kill Evaluation:  Target range is updated for kill evaluation. 
 
PAM Range Update for Kill Evaluation:  Target range is updated for kill evaluation. 
 
Armed Helo Range Update for Kill Evaluation:  Target range is updated for kill 
evaluation. 
 
Record Targets within Keepout Range:  Records number of targets within keepout range. 
 
Record Failures GWS:  Failures by GWS, which means the number of targets that have 
reached keepout range when assigned to GWS. 
 
Record GWS Kills:  Number of kills logged by GWS. 
 
Record Failures GWS for ReEngage:  Number of failures by GWS after first engagement 
of target.  These failures will only occur after an unsuccessful GWS engagement of the 
target. 
 
Record Failures CIWS:  Number of failures by CIWS or number of targets that have 
reached their respective keepout range when assigned to CIWS. 
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Record CIWS Kills:  Number of kills by CIWS. 
 
Record Failures CIWS for ReEngage:  Number of failures by CIWS after first 
engagement of target. 
 
Record Failures PAM:  Number of failures by PAM weapon system or number of targets 
allowed by PAM to reach their respective keepout range. 
 
Record PAM Kills:  Number of targets killed by PAM weapon system. 
 
Record Failures PAM for ReEngage:  Number of failures by PAM after first engagement 
of a target. 
 
Record Failures Armed Helo:  Number of failures by Armed Helo. 
 
Record Armed Helo Kills:  Number of targets killed by Armed Helo. 
 
Record Failures Armed Helo for ReEngage:  Number of failures or number of targets 
allowed to reach keepout range by Armed Helo after first engagement of target. 
 
Record GWS Salvos:  Record total number of GWS salvos.  Each GWS salvo consists of 
3 rounds fired directly at the target. 
 
Record CIWS Bursts:  Number of CIWS bursts fired at targets. 
 
Record PAM Fired:  Record total number of PAM fired at targets. 
 




8.0 TRAINING (TR) 
 
The TR functions of the OATCTEPM are broken down into the following functions:  
Training Action, Schedule, and Event, Synthetic Actions, Synthetic Entities, Simulator, 
Scenario.  There are no model blocks created in ARENA that represent TR functions. 
 
Assumptions: 
1. All training functions within the OA model will remain as described in the OA 
model. 
2. Model blocks for Training do not fit into the ARENA model and have been left 
out.  This does not mean that they should be removed from the OA model. 
3. The scenarios being run through the model are actual scenarios at war-time and 
training is assumed to have been completed prior to the actual scenarios. 
 
 
9.0 FORCE PLANNING / COORDINATION (FP/C) 
 
The FP/C functions of the OATCTEPM are broken down into the following functions:  
Joint BF Orders, Commanders Estimate, COA Repository, BG Orders, and Force 
Integrated Scheduler.  The model blocks created in ARENA that represent FP/C 
functions are shown below with a description of the block: 
 
Send to other:  Mission evaluation concludes that more force is needed to complete 
mission. 
 
Plan Approval:  Decision block that either approves or rejects plan to execute targets.  If 
plan is not approved, the target must go back through the planning stage. 
 
Obtain Clearance to Fire:  Decision block that gives clearance to fire on targets.  If 
clearance to fire is not obtained, a delay for waiting to obtain clearance to fire is executed 
until clearance to fire has been approved. 
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OATCTEPM PROCESS VARIABLES 
 
 
The following tables show the parameters of the different types of process blocks stored in the Arena model.  Each table signifies a 
different kind of block including: Create, Process, Assign, Decide, Record, and Dispose. 
 
 
Create - Basic Process 
Name Entity Type Value Units Entities per Arrival Max Arrivals First Creation 
Search Target Constant 0 Seconds Total Number of Targets 1 0 
 
Table 20.   Create Basic Process Block 
 
Process - Basic Process 
Name Type Action Priority Resources Delay Type Units Allocation Min Value Max Expression 
Search Delay Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 5 10 15 1 
Detection Delay Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 0.5 1 1 1 
Locate Delay Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 0.1 1 1 1 
Large RCS Delay Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Expression Seconds Value Added 0.5 2 1.5 
((Locate_Range - 
33.7)/Locate_Speed) 
Medium RCS Delay Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Expression Seconds Value Added 0.5 2 1.5 
((Locate_Range - 
28.3)/Locate_Speed) 
Firm Track Delay Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 0.1 1 0.3 1 
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Re Classify Delay for 
Unknown Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 0.5 0 1 1 
First Pass Delay Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 1 0 3 1 
Second Pass Delay Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 2 0 5 1 
Validate Target Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 2 0 3 1 
Identify Delay Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 0.1 0 2 1 
Threat Evaluation Delay Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 3 0 10 1 
Target Priority Delay Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 1 0 3 1 
Mission Evaluation Delay Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 5 0 15 1 
Weapon Assign Delay 
GWS Scenario 2 Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 0.5 0 1 1 
Plan Approval Delay Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 15 0 45 1 
Clearance to Fire Delay Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 3 0 10 1 
Delay for Waiting Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 3 0 15 1 
Update Priority Delay Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 0.1 0 0.2 1 
GWS Cycle Standard Seize Delay Release Medium(2) 1 Row Uniform Seconds Value Added 9 1 12 1 
GWS Time of Flight Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Expression Seconds Value Added 0.5 1 1.5 Target_Range_Engage*2.5+7 
GWS Kill Evaluation Delay Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 1 1 5 1 
GWS Reaction Time Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 10 1 15 1 
CIWS Cycle Standard Seize Delay Release Medium(2) 1 Row Uniform Seconds Value Added 5 1 10 1 
CIWS Time of Flight Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Expression Seconds Value Added 0.5 1 1.5 Target_Range_Engage*1.5 
CIWS Kill Evaluation Delay Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 5 1 10 1 
CIWS Reaction Time Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 10 1 15 1 
PAM Cycle Standard Seize Delay Release Medium(2) 1 Row Uniform Seconds Value Added 3 1 10 1 
PAM Time of Flight Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Expression Seconds Value Added 0.5 1 1.5 Target_Range_Engage*3 
PAM Kill Evaluation Delay Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 3 1 5 1 
PAM Reaction Time Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 30 1 60 1 
Armed Helo Cycle Standard Seize Delay Release Medium(2) 1 Row Uniform Seconds Value Added 1 1 3 1 
  145
Armed Helo RePosition 
Scenario 1 Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 5 1 10 Target_Range_Direct*5 
Armed Helo Kill Evaluation 
Delay Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 1 1 3 1 
Armed Helo Time of Flight Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 1 1 3 Target_Range_Direct*5 
Armed Helo Reaction Time Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 5 1 20 1 
Armed Helo RePosition 
Scenario 2 Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 15 1 30 Target_Range_Direct*5 
Weapon Assign Delay 
CIWS Scenario 2 Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 0.5 0 1 1 
Weapon Assign Delay 
PAM Scenario 2 Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 0.5 0 1 1 
Weapon Assign Delay 
Armed Helo Scenario 2 Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 0.5 0 1 1 
Weapon Assign Delay 
CIWS Scenario 1 Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 0.5 0 1 1 
Weapon Assign Delay 
GWS Scenario 1 Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Uniform Seconds Value Added 0.5 0 1 1 
For GWS Kills Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Constant Seconds Value Added 0.5 0 1.5 1 
For CIWS Kills Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Constant Seconds Value Added 0.5 0 1.5 1 
For PAM Kills Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Constant Seconds Value Added 0.5 0 1.5 1 
For Armed Helo Kills Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Constant Seconds Value Added 0.5 0 1.5 1 
Delay for GWS Range Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Expression Seconds Value Added 0.5 2 1.5 
((Target_Range_ReEngage - 
15)/Locate_Speed) 
PAM ReEngage Available Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Constant Seconds Value Added 0.5 0 1.5 1 
Armed Helo ReEngage 
Available Standard Delay Medium(2) 0 Rows Constant Seconds Value Added 0.5 0 1.5 1 
 
Table 21.   Process – Basic Process Blocks
  146
 
Assign – Basic Process 
Name Assignment 
Detect 2 
Small RCS 3 
Medium RCS 3 
Large RCS 3 
Locate Range Update 1 
Firm Track Time 2 
Hostile First Pass 1 
Unknown First Pass 1 
Friendly First Pass 1 
Hostile Second Pass 1 
Friendly Second Pass 1 
Type 1 Target Small 3 
Type 2 Target Medium 3 
Type 3 Target Large 3 
Target Type 1 Weapon Range 1 
Target Type 2 Weapon Range 1 
Target Type 3 Weapon Range 1 
Range Update for Priority 1 
Assign Priority 1 for Target Type 1 1 
Assign Priority 2 for Target Type 1 1 
Assign Priority 3 for Target Type 1 1 
Assign Priority 1 for Target Type 2 1 
Assign Priority 2 for Target Type 2 1 
Assign Priority 3 for Target Type 2 1 
Assign Priority 1 for Target Type 3 1 
Assign Priority 2 for Target Type 3 1 
Assign Priority 3 for Target Type 3 1 
Mission Go 1 
Range Update for Plan 1 
Assign GWS 1 
Assign CIWS 1 
Assign PAM 1 
Assign Armed Helo 1 
Range Update for Engagement 1 
Assign High Priority 1 
GWS Range Update for Kill Evaluation 1 
Assign Higher Priority for GWS ReEngage 2 
CIWS Range Update for Kill Evaluation 1 
Assign Higher Priority for CIWS ReEngage 2 
PAM Range Update for Kill Evaluation 1 
Assign Higher Priority for PAM ReEngage 2 
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Armed Helo Range Update for Kill Evaluation 1 
Assign Higher Priority for Armed Helo ReEngage 2 
Assign CIWS Scenario 1 1 
Assign GWS Scenario 1 1 
Validate Target Time 1 
Identify Target Time 1 
Threat Evaluation Time 1 
Target Priority Time 1 
Mission Evaluation Time 1 
Weapon Assignment Time 1 
Clearance to Fire Time 1 
Direct Engagement Time 1 








Decide - Basic Process 
Name Type % True If Variable Name Attribute Name Is Value 
Locate N-way by Condition 50 Entity Type Variable 1 Attribute 1 >= 1 
Transition to Track 2-way by Condition 50 Attribute Variable 1 Locate_Profile == 0 
Firm Track? 2-way by Condition 50 Attribute Variable 1 Locate_RCS_Type == 1 
Awaiting Firm Track 2-way by Condition 50 Attribute Variable 1 Locate_RCS_Type == 2 
Classify Target N-way by Chance 50 Entity Type Variable 1 Attribute 1 >= 1 
Re Classify Target N-way by Chance 50 Entity Type Variable 1 Attribute 1 >= 1 
Identify Target N-way by Condition 50 Entity Type Variable 1 Attribute 1 >= 1 
Threat Evaluation N-way by Condition 50 Entity Type Variable 1 Attribute 1 >= 1 
Assign Target Priority N-way by Condition 50 Entity Type Variable 1 Attribute 1 >= 1 
Mission Evaluation 2-way by Chance 95 Entity Type Variable 1 Attribute 1 >= 1 
Weapon Assignment Scenario 1 2-way by Condition 50 Attribute Variable 1 Detect_Range == 
3 && (Weapon Assign Delay 
CIWS Scenario 1.NumberIn < 
5) 
Target Type Count N-way by Condition 50 Entity Type Variable 1 Attribute 1 >= 1 
Plan Approval 2-way by Chance 95 Entity Type Variable 1 Attribute 1 >= 1 
Obtain Clearance to Fire 2-way by Chance 85 Entity Type Variable 1 Attribute 1 >= 1 
Range Evaluation 2-way by Condition 50 Attribute Variable 1 Target_Range_Engage > Target_Weapon_Range 
Assign Higher Priority? 2-way by Condition 50 Attribute Variable 1 Target_Range_Engage <= Target_Weapon_Range+1 
Direct Engagement to Weapon N-way by Condition 50 Entity Type Variable 1 Attribute 1 >= 1 
GWS Range Evaluation 2-way by Condition 50 Attribute Variable 1 Target_Range_GWS_Eval > Target_Weapon_Range 
GWS Kill Evaluation 2-way by Chance 80 Entity Type Variable 1 Attribute 1 >= 1 
CIWS Kill Evaluation 2-way by Chance 85 Entity Type Variable 1 Attribute 1 >= 1 
CIWS Range Evaluation 2-way by Condition 50 Attribute Variable 1 Target_Range_CIWS_Eval > Target_Weapon_Range 
PAM Kill Evaluation 2-way by Chance 90 Entity Type Variable 1 Attribute 1 >= 1 
PAM Range Evaluation 2-way by Condition 50 Attribute Variable 1 Target_Range_PAM_Eval > Target_Weapon_Range 
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Armed Helo Kill Evaluation 2-way by Chance 95 Entity Type Variable 1 Attribute 1 >= 1 
Armed Helo Range Evaluation 2-way by Condition 50 Attribute Variable 1 Target_Range_ArmedHelo_Eval > Target_Weapon_Range 
Scenario Position Time for Helo 2-way by Condition 50 Variable Scenario Attribute 1 == 1 
Scenario 1 or Scenario 2? 2-way by Condition 50 Variable Scenario Attribute 1 == 1 
Weapon Assignment Scenario 2 N-way by Condition 50 Entity Type Variable 1 Attribute 1 >= 1 
PAM Available for ReEngage? 2-way by Condition 50 Expression Variable 1 Attribute 1 >= 
(PAM Reaction Time.NumberIn 
+ PAM ReEngage 
Available.NumberIn) < 24 
PAM Available for Engage? 2-way by Condition 50 Expression Variable 1 Attribute 1 >= 
(PAM Reaction Time.NumberIn 
+ PAM ReEngage 
Available.NumberIn) < 24 
Armed Helo Available for Engage? 2-way by Condition 50 Expression Variable 1 Attribute 1 >= 
(Armed Helo Reaction 
Time.NumberIn + Armed Helo 
ReEngage Available.NumberIn) 
< 16 
Armed Helo Available for 
ReEngage? 2-way by Condition 50 Expression Variable 1 Attribute 1 >= 
(Armed Helo Reaction 









Record - Basic Process 
Name Type Value Counter Name 
Record Number of Targets Count 1 Record Number of Targets 
Record Number of Large Targets Count 1 Record Number of Large Targets 
Record Number of Small Targets Count 1 Record Number of Small Targets 
Record Number of Medium Targets Count 1 Record Number of Medium Targets 
Record Targets within Keepout Range Count 1 Record Targets within Keepout Range 
Record GWS Salvos Count 1 Record GWS Salvos 
Record Failures GWS Count 1 Record Failures GWS 
Record GWS Kills Count 1 Record GWS Kills 
Record Failures CIWS Count 1 Record Failures CIWS 
Record CIWS Kills Count 1 Record CIWS Kills 
Record CIWS Bursts Count 1 Record CIWS Bursts 
Record Failures PAM Count 1 Record Failures PAM 
Record PAM Kills Count 1 Record PAM Kills 
Record PAM Fired Count 1 Record PAM Fired 
Record Failures Armed Helo Count 1 Record Failures Armed Helo 
Record Armed Helo Kills Count 1 Record Armed Helo Kills 
Record Armed Helo Fired Count 1 Record Armed Helo Fired 
 
Table 24.   Record – Basic Process Blocks 
 
Dispose - Basic Process 
Name 
Disregard Track if Outbound 
Disregard Track First Pass 
Disregard Track Second Pass 
Send to other 
Target within Keepout Range 
Target within Keepout Range GWS 
GWS Kill 
Target within Keepout Range CIWS 
CIWS Kill 
Target within Keepout Range PAM 
PAM Kill 
Target within Keepout Range Armed Helo 
Armed Helo Kill 
 
Table 25.   Dispose – Basic Process Blocks 
  151
OATCTEPM ENGAGEMENT FLOW  
 
This section of figures describes the process flow within the OATCTEPM. Because of its complexity, it has been broken into many 



















































































Figure 33.   Data / Information Services (DIS) Function Continued 
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Figure 34.   Planning, Assessment, and Decision (PAD) Function 
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Figure 35.   Planning, Assessment, and Decision (PAD) Function Continued 
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Figure 37.   Weapon / Asset Services (W/AS) 
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Figure 38.   Mission Execution (ME) Function for Gun Weapon System (GWS) 
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Figure 39.   Mission Execution (ME) Function for Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) 
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Figure 41.   Mission Execution (ME) Function for Armed Helicopter (Helo) 
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OATCTEPM PROCESS VARIABLE INPUT DISTRIBUTIONS 
The following figures show the actual distributions generated by the Arena software as inputs to the data presented in section V. This 
is presented for completeness of detail concerning the model used and the method for generating the results discussed. 
 
Figure 42.   Input Analyzer Firm Track Times for Scenario 1 
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Figure 43.   Input Analyzer Validate Target Times for Scenario 1 
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Figure 44.   Input Analyzer Identify Target Times for Scenario 1 
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Figure 45.   Input Analyzer Threat Evaluation Times for Scenario 1 
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Figure 46.   Input Analyzer Target Priority Times for Scenario 1 
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Figure 47.   Input Analyzer Mission Evaluation Times for Scenario 1 
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Figure 48.   Input Analyzer Weapon Assignment Times for Scenario 1 
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Figure 49.   Input Analyzer Plan Approval Times for Scenario 1 
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Figure 50.   Input Analyzer Clearance to Fire Times for Scenario 1 
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Figure 51.   Input Analyzer Direct Engagement Times for Scenario 1 
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Figure 52.   Input Analyzer Firm Track Times for Scenario 2 
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Figure 53.   Input Analyzer Validate Target Times for Scenario 2 
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Figure 55.   Input Analyzer Threat Evaluation Times for Scenario 2 
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Figure 59.   Input Analyzer Plan Approval Times for Scenario 2 
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Figure 60.   Input Analyzer Clearance to Fire Times for Scenario 2 
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Figure 61.   Input Analyzer Direct Engagement Times for Scenario 2 
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APPENDIX III: RADAR MODEL DETAILED EXPLANATION OF 
CALCULATIONS 
PURPOSE OF THE RADAR MODEL  
 
The intent of the radar model is to simulate a modern surface search sensor. It provides 
the OA model associated ranges given the probability of detection ( DP ) and radar cross 
section (RCS). Furthermore, it plays a pinnacle role in the Search and Detect portion of 
the OATCTEPM.  
 
 
RADAR MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
 
The assumptions applied to the creation of this model are listed below in table 26. 
 
1 Assume all ideal environmental conditions 
2 Assume no electronic interferences 
3 Assume no radar losses 
4 Assume all targets with a RCS greater than one to be considered a firm track which 
equates to a DP  equal to ninety percent at a range of 21.96 NM. This is determined 
from the following calculation: 
R NM =1.23( )TARGETRADAR hh + =1.23*( 133 ft+ 40 ft) = 21.96 NM  
 








DESIGN OF THE RADAR MODEL 
 
This basic model has been designed using a range relationship taken from Principles of 
Naval Weapons Systems (Payne 2006). The relationship allows for a target range to be 
determined if the target’s RCS is known and a previous RCS with range can be provided. 
The algebraic form of this equation, EQ(1), can be viewed below and the variables are 
defined as follows: 
• 1R  is the known range of  a target 
• 2R  is the unknown range  
• 1σ  is the known RCS of a target 
• 2σ  is the known RCS of a target with unknown range 
 
R 2 = 14
1
2 * Rσ
σ   EQ(1) 
In order to facilitate the efforts of this model, ranges for a particular RCS had to be 
created with a specific set of signal to noise ratios (S/N). The S/Ns required were 
extracted from a set of Rice curves printed in Radar Principles for the Non-Specialist 
(Toomay 1998). These S/Ns were chosen for a set of DP s being used for this model along 
with a value for a probability of false alarm ( FAP ) of 
610− . In addition, the required RCS 
and known range information was found in The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval 
Weapon Systems (Friedman 2006). These values were then substituted into EQ(2) to 
calculate a set of ranges for a series of cross sections. The baseline values used for this 
model are for a RCS of 1 2m and maximum range of detection, which is associated to a 
DP  equal to fifty percent, of forty thousand yards. Furthermore, a description of variables 
from EQ(2) is provided below:  
• 1=RCSR is the range to be determined 











NS is the signal to noise ratio for the probability of detection for 1=RCSR  
 
  R 1=RCS = (10
))40///()(( 211 DPDP NSNSRLOG −+ )  EQ(2) 
 
After plugging the values into the EQ(2) and performing a set of calculations, a series of 
ranges were computed. These ranges for a RCS of 1 2m  were created for a set of DP s that 
began at .50 and incrementally increased by a value of .05 to a maximum of .90. The 










Table 27.   Ranges (m) for a RCS of 1 2m   
 
The results presented in table 27 were then substituted back into EQ(1) and used to 
determine ranges for targets of known RCSs. These RCSs that were determined by this 
method hold values of .1 2m  and .5 2m  and can be viewed in table 28 Radar Range (m) 
as a Function of RCS ( 2m ) for given DP .  
  
Pd S/N Range (m) 
90 13.5 32225.3 
85 13 33166.3 
80 12.8 33647.1 
75 12.5 34134.8 
70 12.3 34530 
65 12 35131.5 
60 11.8 35538.3 
55 11.5 36157.4 










                  
Table 28.   Radar Range (m) as a Function of RCS ( 2m ) for given DP  
DP  RCS = .1
2m  RCS = .5 2m  RCS = 1 2m  
.9 15238.41 27098.15 32225.3 
.85 15683.38 27889.43 33166.3 
.80 15910.71 28293.69 33647.1 
.75 16141.34 28703.81 34134.8 
.70 16328.25 29036.19 34530.0 
.65 16612.68 29541.98 35131.5 
.60 16805.04 29884.06 35538.3 
.55 17097.77 30404.62 36157.4 
.50 17295.76 30756.69 36576.1 
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APPENDIX IV: IMPROVED MODEL STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
This appendix provides the outputs of the improved model.  Research in decision aides 
and automation as well as meetings with the stake holder resulted in numerous runs of the 
improved model.  The key human interaction times identified in the analysis of the base 
model (Plan Approval, Mission Evaluation and Threat Evaluation) were improved in 5 
percent increments up to the maximum of 30 percent. The outputs of all six runs of the 
improved model for each scenario are provided below.  This data was utilized to make 
the final decision on the appropriate level of reduction to be applied for the improved 
model presented in Section V: Results and Analysis.  
 
 
B. SCENARIO 1 OUTPUT 
 
Figures 62-65 illustrate the 95 percent confidence intervals for the average value of the 
number of leakers, number of targets, C3 time and the Probability of Raid Annihilation 
observed in the base case and all six improved cases.  These confidence intervals were 






















Figure 65.   Average Probability of Raid Annihilation per Improved Model 
 
Figure 66 illustrate the output from Arena’s Process Analyzer (PAN).  The PAN 
generates a quick overview of all the results in an easy to read table.  The table displays 
the model cases that were run, the number of replications, the control variables that were 
adjusted and the average values for the key outputs.  PAN also recommends the best case 





Figure 66.   PAN Results for Scenario 1 
 
There are slight variations in values provided from Arena’s Output Analyzer and PAN.  
The variation can be attributed to the different strings being used by the random number 
generator within each analysis.  The 30 percent case was recommended as the best option 
for the improved model based on the fact that it has the lowest average number of leakers 
(0.583), the lowest C3 time and the highest PRA.  PAN was unable to recommend a 
second option so the 95 percent confidence interval figures were used to make this 
determination.  The next best option is the 20 percent model based on the fact that it has 
the second lowest average number of leakers (0.689) which equates to the second highest 
PRA and it has the third lowest C3 time.  The fact that the confidence intervals are smaller 
and fall within the intervals of the 25 percent case were also determining factors. 
 
 
C. SCENARIO 2 OUTPUT 
 
Figures 67-70 illustrate the 95 percent confidence intervals for the average value of the 
number of leakers, number of targets, C3 time and the Probability of Raid Annihilation 
observed in the base case and all six improved cases.  These confidence intervals were 






















Figure 70.   Average Probability of Raid Annihilation per Improved Model 
 
Figure 71 illustrates the output from Arena’s Process Analyzer (PAN).  The PAN 
generates a quick overview of all the results in an easy to read table.  The table displays 
the model cases that were run, the number of replications, the control variables that were 
adjusted and the average values for the key outputs.  PAN also recommends the best case 





Figure 71.   PAN Results for Scenario 2 
 
There are slight variations in values provided from Arena’s Output Analyzer and PAN.  
The variation can be attributed to the different strings being used by the random number 
generator within each analysis.  The 30 percent case was recommended as the best option 
for the improved model based on the fact that it has the lowest average number of leakers 
(4.718), the lowest C3 time and the highest PRA.  PAN was unable to recommend a 
second option so the 95 percent confidence interval figures were used to make this 
determination.  The next best option is the 25 percent model based on the fact that it has 
the second lowest average number of leakers (5.068) which equates to the second highest 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
AT3 Advanced Tactical Targeting Technology  
AMSTE Affordable Moving Surface Target Engagement  
ATO Air Tasking Order  
AMW Amphibious Warfare  
MW Mine Warfare  
AAW Anti-Air Warfare  
ADW Air Defense Warfare 
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare  
ASUW Anti-Surface Warfare  
BATGRU Battle Group 
BF Battle Force 
BG Battle Group  
BIT Built-In Test  
CIWS Close-In Weapons System  
C2 Command and Control  
C2W Command and Control Warfare  
C3 Command, Control, and Communication  
ACC Commander, Air Combat Command  
COA Common Operating Area  
CS Common Services  
CS Common Services  
DX/DR Data Extraction/Data Reduction  
CONOP Concept of Operation  
COTS Consumer Off the Shelf  
CUs Cooperating Units  
CEC Cooperative Engagement Capability  
DIS Data / Information Services  
dBm2 Decibel-meter squared 
DAU Defense Acquisition University’s web site  
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency  
DOD Department of Defense  
DCE Detect Control Engage  
DCE Detect, Control, and Engage  
DoDD DoD Directive  
ES Electronic Warfare Support  
EO Electro-optical  
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EQ Equation 
EPS Expeditionary Pervasive Sensing  
EXCOMM External Communication  
FAC Fast Attack Craft  
FAB-T Family of Beyond Line-of-sight Terminals  
FIAC Fast Inshore Attack Craft  
FPB Fast Patrol Boat  
FD/FI Fault Detection / Fault Isolation  
Ft Feet   
FP/C Force Planning / Coordination  
GIG-BE GIG-Bandwidth Expansion  
GIG Global Information Grid  
GPS Global Positioning System  
GAO Government Accountability Office  
GWS Gun Weapons System  
HE High Explosives  
HVU High Value Unit  
HM&E Hull, Mechanical & Electrical  
HUMINT Human intelligence  
IFF Identification Friend-or-foe  
IED Improvised Explosive Devices  
INS Inertial Navigation Systems  
IA Information Assurance  
IR Infrared  
IFC Integrated Fire Control  
INTEL Intelligence  
JDL Joint Directors of Laboratories  
JITC Joint Interoperability Test Command  
JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council  
JTDLMP Joint Tactical Data Link Management Plan  
JTF Joint Task Force  
Km Kilometers  
LAN Local Area Network  
MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development Command  
MTTR Mean-Time-To-Repair  
MOEs Measures of Effectiveness  
MOPs Measures of Performance  
m Meters  
ME Mission Execution  
MOSA Modular Open System Approach  
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NDC Naval Doctrine Command  
NSA National Security Agency  
NM Nautical Mile   
NSW Naval Special Warfare  
NWDC Naval Warfare Development Command  
NAV Navigation  
NRT Near Real Time  
NCW Network Centric Warfare  
OODA Observe, Orient, Decide and Act   
ONR Office of Naval Research  
OA Open Architecture  
OAAM Open Architecture Assessment Model  
OACE Open Architecture Computing Environment  
OATCTEPM Open Architecture Time Critical Target Engagement Process Model  
OAWSDM Open Architecture Warfare System Domain Model  
OSJTF Open Systems Joint Task Force  
Ao Operational Availability  
OV Operational View  
OSS Optical Sighting System  
OASIS 
Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information 
Standards  
PAD Planning, Assessment & Decision  
PTTI Precise Time and Time Interval  
PAM Precision Attack Missile  
Pd Probability of Detection  
Pfa Probability of False Alarm  
PMG Program Managers Guide  
R Range  
RCS Radar cross section  
RT Real time  
REDS Real Time Execution Decision Support  
RV Remotely Controlled Vehicle  
RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade  
ROE Rules of Engagement  
S/D Search / Detect  
SOA Service Oriented Architecture  
SEDP System Engineering Design Process  
S/N Signal to Noise   
SIAP/SIGP Single Integrated Air or Ground Picture  
SIAP Single Integrated Air Picture  
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SPO Special Projects Office  
m2 Square Meters   
SOW Statement of work   
STW Strike Warfare  
TAO Tactical Action Officer  
TADILs Tactical Digital Information Links  
TACSIT Tactical Situation  
TTNT Tactical Targeting Network Technology  
TTP Techniques, and Procedures  
TCT Time Critical Targeting  
TDMA Time Demand Multiple Access  
TR Training  
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command  
TSAT Transformational Satellite  
TEL Transporter erector-launcher  
UN United Nations  
USN United States Navy  
USAF Unites States Air Force   
VLS Vertical Launch system  
W/AS Weapon / Asset Services  
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